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THE EMPLOYEE'S RIGHT TO REPRESENTATION
DURING EMPLOYER INVESTIGATORY
INTERVIEWS: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS
OF THE EVOLUTION OF
WEINGARTEN PRINCIPLES
DAVID L. GREGORYt
I.

INTRODUCTION

HE investigatory interview poses an obvious threat to an employee, since information garnered during such a session may
subsequently be used in disciplinary proceedings. This article will examine the important labor relations issues surrounding the scope of
the employee's right to representation during employer investigatory
interviews concerning employee misconduct. In the companion cases
of NLRB v. Wengarten, Inc. I and InternationalLadies' Garment Workers'
Union v. Quahty Manufacturing Co. ,2 the United States Supreme Court
held that the union employee has a statutory right to representation
by a union official upon request during investigatory interviews
which the employee reasonably fears could result in disciplinary action. 3 A discussion of these two cases and important predecessor decisions will highlight and frame the initial analysis.
The article will then concentrate on recent decisions by the National Labor Relations Board (Board) and by the courts of appeals
which have expanded, in some instances, and limited, in others, the
t Assistant Professor of Law, St. Johns University Law School. B.A. Catholic
University of America, 1973; M.B.A. Wayne St. University, 1977; J.D. University of
Detroit, 1980; LL.M. Yale University Law School, 1982.
1. 420 U.S. 251 (1975). The Supreme Court validated the National Labor Relations Board's position that § 7 of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 157
(1976), guarantees an employee's right to union representation during interviews
which he reasonably fears may result in disciplinary action. Id. at 256-5.7, 260.
2. 420 U.S. 276 (1975). In Quait, several employees complained about the system for determining wages according to the amount of work. Id. at 278. One of the
employees was called to the employer's office after she turned off her machine. The
employee insisted upon having a union representative at the meeting and refused to
submit to the interview without representation. After several later encounters in
which the employee refused to meet with a supervisor alone, the employee was discharged. Id.
3. See 420 U.S. at 250-51; 420 U.S. at 281. The Supreme Court in Weingarten
noted that an employee's right to request representation in an interview is limited to
situations where the employee "reasonably believes" the investigation will result in
disciplinary action. 420 U.S. at 251. The Court explained that this reasonable belief
will be measured by objective standards under all the circumstances of the case and
not by a probe of the employee's subjective motivations. Id. at 251 n.5.

(572)
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Weingarten right to union representation. Finally, this article will conclude with an assessment of probable future developments and will
offer some suggestions for further refining Wengarten principles.
II.

PRE-WEINGARTEN LAW

The first major decision regarding employee rights to representation at an employer interview was Ross Gear & Tool Co. 4 In Ross, an
employee, Mae Ford, was discharged because she refused to meet
with her company's labor relations representative without a union
representative. 5 The Board concluded that the company's labor relations representative interfered with Ford's section 7 rights when he
ordered her to appear before him without union representation. It
also concluded that the employee's dismissal constituted a violation of
sections 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(3) of the National Labor Relations Act
(Act) .6
In reaching this conclusion, the Board suggested that the company's labor relations representative had ordered Ford to meet with
him in an attempt to resolve a dispute out in her department. 7 Moreover, the Board concluded that Ford had properly inferred that her
employer's purpose in calling her to his office was to admonish her.8
According to the Board, the cause of the general discord was Ford's
attempt, as the union's recording secretary and committeewoman, to
challenge the company's policy against smoking by female employees
in the workplace. 9 The Board therefore concluded that it had been
unlawful for the company's labor relations representative to order
4. 63 N.L.R.B. 1012 (1945), enforcement denied, 158 F.2d 607 (7th Cir. 1947).
5. Id. at 1033.
6. Id. at 1034. The Board concluded that the dismissal of this employee violated
§ 8(3) of the Act because it "necessarily discouraged membership in the union." Id.
7. Id. at 1024. Both men and women were employed in the employee's department, the inspection department. There was also a split in union membership within
this department: three women, including the dismissed employee, belonged to the
union, while five women were not members of the union. Nonetheless, the union
represented all of the employees by virtue of its certification. Id. at 1222. Ford became unpopular with the non-union women employees when she challenged the
company's restriction against smoking by women employees. Id.
8. Id. at 1024.
9. Id. at 1021-23. The Board noted that Ford had previously presented a grievance in a meeting between union committee members and the company's labor-management representative. During this meeting, she requested that women in the
department be allowed to smoke cigarettes in the workplace just as men were then
permitted to do. Id. at 1021. After the company representative gave the employee
permission to inform the women in her department that they were now allowed to
smoke, a few non-union women in the department and the chief inspector of the
department became antagonistic and labelled her a "trouble-maker." Id. at 1022-23.
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Ford to meet with him alone upon penalty of discharge.' 0 In so concluding, the Board stated, however, that the right to insist upon union
representation derived not from the individual's status as an employee but rather from her membership on a union committee."
The Seventh Circuit subsequently reversed the Board's decision,
largely because it viewed the facts in a different light.' 2 The court
3
It
emphasized, for instance, the employee's "record for tardiness."'
also discussed at length the dissension she had caused among some of
the female employees when she fought for their right to smoke on the
job. 14 Unlike the Board, the Seventh Circuit viewed the employer's
request to meet with the employee alone as motivated not by any predetermined decision to admonish her, but rather by a desire to resolve
interpersonal discord about which the employer had received a complaint.' 5 Thus, when the employee repeatedly refused to meet with
her employer unaccompanied by a union representative, the em10. Id. at 1034.
11. Id. In explaining its holding, the Board emphasized that the dismissed employee was a member of a union committee:
Assuming, without deciding, that an individual employee is not entitled
to insist upon union representation whenever he or she may be called in by
management to be admonished, in the instant case Ford was being called in
partly as a member of a union committee about a matter concerning which
the respondent had already dealt with that committee as the exclusive bargaining representative. Under these circumstances . . . Ford was within
her statutory rights in refusing to handle the matter alone and in insisting
that Stecker take it up with the entire union committee, of which she was a
member.
Id. at 1032-33.
12. NLRB v. Ross Gear & Tool Co., 158 F.2d 607, 611-13 (7th Cir. 1947). The
Seventh Circuit stated that there was no basis for the Board's inference that the employee was discharged because she was a union official or that she was dismissed for
the purpose of restraint, intimidation or coercion. Id. at 613. The court found that
her discharge was based on insubordination and that she had signed, without protest,
a "termination of employment" statement articulating this reason for her discharge.
Id. The court concluded that "[i]t is difficult to believe that a woman of Ford's
intelligence would sign such a statement if she had any reason to think her discharge
was for any cause other than that stated." Id. at 614.
13. Id. at 612. The court noted that "[wihile she was a skilled worker and a
valuable employee in many respects, she had a record for tardiness far exceeding any
other employee in the department, and the evidence strongly indicated that she was a
general trouble maker and possessed an exaggerated idea of her importance." Id.
14. Id. The Seventh Circuit noted that when Ford posted a notice describing
the smoking privilege which she had won from management, "[t]he battle of words
and epithets between smokers and non-smokers greatly accelerated." Id. At one
point, "Ford and another woman agreed to go outside to settle their differences in a
fist fight." Id. The court noted that the situation became so tense that two of the
women employees in the department asked to be released after telling the labormanagement representative that they had "tolerated Ford as long as they could." Id.
15. Id. The court stated that, after two women employees complained to the
labor-management representative, he had promised to speak to Ford. Id. The court
suggested that the record showed without question that the company representative's
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ployer, according to the court, was justified in firing her for violation
of the company's rule that an employee who refused to comply with
16
the direction of a supervisory employee was subject to discharge.
Although the Seventh Circuit nowhere articulated the difference
between its approach and the Board's to the same set of circumstances, it appears to be a difference in the degree of willingness to
probe behind certain facts. For instance, only the Board imputed ill
motives to the employer by suggesting that the employee had properly inferred that the purpose of the meeting was to admonish her.
The court's aversion to look behind facts in Ross Gear and the Board's
readiness to undertake close factual analysis are characteristic of the
different approaches taken by the Board and the courts of appeals in
deciding subsequent cases on the employee's right to representation.
Dobbs Houses, Inc. ,'17 decided almost twenty years after Ross Gear,
was the first Board decision squarely to address the employee's right
to representation during employer investigatory interviews. Because
this decision involved an employee who was not also a union official,
as was the case in Ross Gear, its holding is not limited to an employee
in a special union capacity.18 The Board in Dobbs Houses adopted the
findings of the trial examiner and upheld the termination of an employee who had repeatedly violated the employer's express rule
against union solicitation on company time and concluded the employee was not entitled to representation under the circumstances.' 9
The trial examiner, in particular, considered the allegation that the
employer violated section 8(a)(1) of the Act by refusing to accede to
the employee's request for a union representative during the meeting
regarding the employee's discharge. He concluded that the employer
was not required to allow the presence of a union representative duronly purpose in requesting an interview with the employee "was a final attempt to
iron out the friction which existed among the women" in her department. Id. at 613.
16. Id. The court observed that the company representative had directed Ford
to come to his office alone or else she would be dismissed. d. After she refused to
come to his office, she was dismissed for insubordination and for violating a longstanding company rule that "an employee who refused to comply with the direction
of a supervisory employee was subject to discharge." Id. at 612-13.
17. 145 N.L.R.B. 1565 (1964).
18. Id. at 1571. The trial examiner in Dobbs Houses recognized that the employee was a union member but stated that she was not being interviewed because of
any involvement in protected union activity. Id. The examiner discovered that although the employer was opposed to the union and had previously warned the employee about actively soliciting other waitresses for the union while on duty, the
interview in question concerned the employee's derogatory remarks about the employer and the company on the day following the reprimand of her solicitation. Id.
at 1570. The examiner distinguished these facts from those in Ross Gear which involved an employee who was also a union official. Id. at 1571.
19. Id. at 1570-71.
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ing meetings that were called for the purpose of admonishing or disciplining an employee. 20 Besides looking to the Act, the trial examiner
relied on dictum in Ross Gear which suggested that an individual employee who was not acting in the capacity of a union official might
2
not be entitled to a right to union representation. 1
The next Board decision to consider the union employee's right
to union representation in certain meetings with his employer was
Texaco, Inc., Houston Producing Di'vz'sion .22 This time, however, the
Board concluded that the employee was entitled to union representation at a meeting with his employer concerning his suspension. 23 Furthermore, the Board traced this right not only to section 8(a)(1) of the
Act as it had done in Ross Gear, but also to section 8(a)(5). 24 Under
section 8(a)(5), it is an unfair labor practice for an employer "to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees." 25 The Fifth Circuit, however, disagreed with the Board's
26
analysis and reversed its decision.
The controversy leading to the employer's alleged violations of
these statutory rights arose when an employee was observed stealing
20. Id. at 1571. The trial examiner stated:
I fail to perceive anything in the Act which obliges an employer to permit
the presence of a representative of the bargaining agent in every situation
where an employer is compelled to admonish or to otherwise take disciplinary action against an employee, particularly in those situations where the
employee's conduct is unrelated to any legitimate union or concerted activity. An employer undoubtedly has the right to maintain day-to-day discipline in the plant or on the working premises and it seems to me that only
exceptional circumstances would warrant any interference with this right.
Id.
21. Id. The examiner noted the following language from Ross Gear: "Assuming,
without deciding, that an individual employee is not entitled to insist upon union
representation whenever he or she may be called in by management to be admonished. . . ." Id. (quoting Ross Gear & Tool Co., 63 N.L.R.B. at 1033).
22. 168 N.L.R.B. 361 (1967), enforcement dented, 408 F.2d 142 (5th Cir. 1969).
23. Id. at 362. The Board stated that the employer's refusal to respect the employee's request that the bargaining representative be permitted to represent him at
the meeting interfered with and restrained him in the exercise of rights guaranteed
by § 7 of the Act. The Board noted that there was no evidence that the employee or
union waived this right to representation or had agreed to channel disputes into the
procedures set forth in the contract grievance provisions. Id.
24. Id. The Board stated that the employer's refusal to deal with the union
representative "transgressed its statutory obligation to bargain with the union concerning the terms and conditions of employment of the employees it represents,"
thereby violating § 8(a)(5) as well as § 8(a)(l) of the Act by restraining and coercing
an employee in exercise of his § 7 rights. Id.
25. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1976). In Texaco Inc., Houston Producing DivtIion,
the employee was not a union member, but he was part of a collective bargaining
unit which had selected the union to represent them. 168 N.L.R.B. at 361-62.
26. Texaco, Inc., Houston Producing Div. v. NLRB, 408 F.2d 142, 145 (5th Cir.
1969).
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company property and was subsequently suspended without pay. 2 7
Although the employee was not a member of the union, he was part
of a unit of employees represented by that union. 28 After the union's
field steward complained that the employee should have had union
representation, Texaco began to investigate the matter. 29 It set a
meeting date and invited the employee to defend himself. Prior to
this meeting, the union requested the right to represent the employee,
but this request was denied. At the meeting, the employee also requested union representation, but once again this request was denied. 30 He was questioned and then asked to sign a statement
3
admitting the theft. '
Central to the Board's decision was its characterization of the
32
employer's purpose behind the second meeting with the employee.
33
Taking issue with the trial examiner's "too narrow a view,"' the
Board observed that the second meeting was called not merely to investigate the theft and gather additional information, but to complete
the company's case against the employee in order to justify disciplinary action. 34 This characterization formed the basis of the Board's
27. Id. at 143. A Texaco employee, Gilberto Alaniz, was suspended by his foreman on November 5, 1965, after the foreman observed Alaniz leaving the plant with
a two-gallon can of kerosene which belonged to the company. Id. The foreman's
action was in compliance with a company policy which required that an employee
suspected of theft be suspended immediately with the understanding that he would
suffer no loss of pay if subsequent investigation failed to support the suspicion. Id.
28. Id. at 144 n.3.
29. 168 N.L.R.B. at 361.
30. Id. After denying the employee's request for union representation, one of
the company representatives stated that there would be no interview if Alaniz insisted on union representation and that Alaniz would then be free to go. Alaniz,
however, remained and was questioned. Id.
31. Id. At the November 17th meeting Alaniz signed a statement prepared by
the company in which he conceded that he had taken two gallons of the company
kerosene, promised to do his job in a manner which would do credit to him, and
asked that consideration be given "on past service to Texaco." Id. Alaniz was suspended without pay for 161/2 working days, but he was thereafter allowed to return to
work. Id.
32. See notes 33-34 and accompanying text hfra.
33. 168 N.L.R.B. at 361-62. The Board noted that the trial examiner found
that no grievance had been raised in the November 17th meeting with Alaniz; hence,
no violation of § 8(a)(5) of the Act occurred. Id. The trial examiner also concluded
that the employer had not violated § 8(a)(1) in denying Alaniz union representation
at the meeting because Alaniz could have filed a formal grievance, thereby assuring
such representation. Id. at 362. The Board commented that the "Trial Examiner
took too narrow a view of the issues before him." Id.
34. Id. The Board noted:
[T]he November 17 meeting was not simply a part of an investigation into
some alleged theft and Alaniz was not invited solely to provide the company representatives with information. Rather the meeting was concerned
essentially with Alaniz and his alleged theft, the facts of which were known
to management representatives some two weeks earlier, and more specifi-
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section 8(a)(5) analysis:
Thus it is clear that on November 17 [the date of the second
meeting] the Company sought to deal directly with Alaniz
[the employee] concerning matters affecting his terms and
conditions of employment. . . . [I]n view of Alaniz's request for union representation at the meeting and the
Union's evident willingness to represent him . . .we find
that the respondent's refusal to deal with the Union on that
occasion transgressed its statutory obligation to bargain
with the union concerning the terms and conditions of employment of the employees it represents. 35
The Fifth Circuit's subsequent reversal of the Board decision,
like the Seventh Circuit's reversal in Ross Gear, was based, at least in
part, on its different view of the facts. 36 It was also based in part on
two cases--Chevron Oil Co. 37 and Jacobe-Pearson Ford, Inc. 3 8-which
were decided by the Board subsequent to the Board's decision in Texaco. The Fifth Circuit, in Texaco, Inc., Houston Producing Division, relied
on these two cases for the proposition that "[t]he Board has properly
recognized that an employee's right to union representation does not
apply to all dealings with his employer which may eventually or ultimately affect the terms and conditions of his employment. ' 39 Implicit in the court's reliance on these two cases was its view that in the
case before it the second employee-employer meeting did not drectly
affect the terms and conditions of the employee's employment. The
court made this view of the facts explicit when it went on to state that
the meeting or interview in question was purely investigatory, and
that the employer was not committed to a course of disciplinary action prior to the interview. 40 Thus, the Fifth Circuit, in holding that
sections 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(5) of the Act were not violated by the emcally with the company's concluding its "case" against Alaniz in order to
provide a "record" to support disciplinary action, if deemed appropriate.
Id
35. Id.
36. For a discussion of the Fifth Circuit's factual analysis in Texaco, Inc., Houston
Producing Div., see note 40 and accompanying text znfa.
37. 168 N.L.R.B. 574 (1967). For a discussion of Chevron Oil Co., see notes 44-49
and accompanying text tf/a.
38. 172 N.L.R.B. 594 (1968). For a discussion of Jacobe-Pearson Ford, Inc., see
notes 50-56 and accompanying text ihfna.
39. 408 F.2d at 144 (citing Jacobe-Pearson Ford, Inc., 172 N.L.R.B. 594 (1968);
Chevron Oil Co., 168 N.L.R.B. 594 (1967)).
40. Id. at 145. As the Fifth Circuit observed, the "[f]oreman's suspension of
Alaniz was conditional pending the outcome of an investigation and by no means
committed the company to a course of action." Id.
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ployer, distinguished between meetings called for the purpose of uncovering additional facts about the employee's alleged misconduct
and those called with the express purpose of taking disciplinary
action.

41

This distinction between investigatory and disciplinary interviews which the Fifth Circuit relied upon in Texaco, Inc., Houston Produci'ng Di'visi'on4 2 appeared in its embryonic stages in the two earlier
Board decisions. In Chevron Oil Co. ,43 the Board held that the statutory right to union representation did not arise until two events occurred: a management decision was made to affect, in some adverse
way, an employee's terms of employment, and the decision was on the
brink of implementation. 4 4 Neither event had occurred in Chevron Oil
Co., where management had established a bifurcated system of review. The first part of this system consisted of a fact-finding meeting
during which the employee was not permitted to have union representation. The second stage consisted of a disciplinary meeting,
which was held after disciplinary measures had been discussed by
management. During this second meeting, however, both the employee and his union representative were permitted to make comments or modify earlier statements. 45 In Chevron Oil Co. , several
41. Id. at 144. The Fifth Circuit stated that the evidence was overwhelming
that the interview was investigatory in nature and there was absolutely no evidence
that the comptroller sought to deal with Alaniz about the consequences of his alleged
misconduct. Id.
42. Id. at 145.
43. 168 N.L.R.B. 574 (1967).
44. Id. at 578. The Board adopted the trial examiner's statement that the right
to union representation does not arise under the Act unless a "grievance" exists from
management's formulation of a decision which will adversely affect an employee's
wages, hours, or other conditions or terms of employment and that decision is on the
brink of implementation. Id.
45. Id. at 577. The employees in Chevron Oil were charged with insubordination
after they disregarded a foreman's order to stay at their work stations at the Perth
Amboy Refinery until 7:30 a.m., the normal quitting time, rather than leaving earlier
at 7:15 a.m. Id. The trial examiner related the testimony of a labor management
representative describing the bifurcated interview process for disciplinary infractions:
[A] factfinding session is held at which the employee will be invited to present his side of the story so that management representatives may make a
fair appraisal of all the evidence. . . . The employee is told that, because
the purpose of the meeting is essentially to gather basic information and
because management representatives at a factfinding session are not authorized to dole out punishment, the presence of a union representative is unnecessary . . ..
When a decision to discipline has been reached, Respondent schedules a
disciplinary meeting at which the affected employee and his union representative are invited to appear. . . . At the disciplinary meeting the facts
again are presented to the group present. Once more everyone present has
the opportunity to comment, to amend, alter, modify or whatever, including of course the union steward.
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employees who were suspended after the second meeting with the employer and their bargaining agent alleged that their section 8(a)(5)
rights were violated when they were not permitted to have their bargaining agent present with them during the initial fact-finding meetings. 46 The Board, however, concluded that the employees' statutory
rights had not even arisen 47 because not only had no disciplinary action been decided on prior to the initial fact-finding meetings, 48 but
the person conducting them was without authority to take discipli49
nary action at these meetings.
In Jacobe-Pearson Ford, Inc. ,50 the Board concluded that an employee's section 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(5) rights were not violated by denying union representation at a meeting scheduled with the employer
which ultimately never took place. 5 1 The controversy in this case
arose when an employee turned aside an automotive repair job, estimated to require 45 to 60 minutes of work, and left work five minutes
46. Id. at 578. The employees argued that "an employer violates section 8(a)(5)
of the Act when he fails to consult with the duly designated bargaining agent of his
employees during the course of a preliminary investigation to ascertain whether an
employee has engaged in conduct in contravention of plant rules which justifies the
invocation of disciplinary measures affecting job tenure." Id. The employees also
argued that it was a violation of § 8(a)(1) "to deprive employees of the advice and
counsel of a union representative whenever the possihi/ity of disciplinary action may
be visited upon them." Id.
47. Id. at 578. The Board adopted the examiner's position that although §§ 9(a)
and 8(a)(5) of the Act obligate an employer to deal with a duly designated labor
organization concerning all matters which affect the employment tenure of represented employees, "this is not to say that a bargaining agent must be privy to management councils, or that represented employees must be shielded by that agent from
company inquiries, on each and every occasion when management embarks upon an
investigation to ascertain whether plant discipline has been breached." Id.
48. Id. at 577. Although the trial examiner noted that before the initial factfinding interview, the superintendent and manager of the department had "reached
a tentative decision . . . to mete out some form of punishment to the nine employees
for insubordination" and that after the fact-finding interview, the manager's staff
decided to suspend the employees for 3 days without pay, the Board stressed that this
initial interview was merely for the purpose of "fact-finding" and such punishment
could not be implemented at the interview. Id.
49. Id. at 578. The examiner noted that the company superintendent lacked the
authority to discipline the employees at the fact-finding interviews. Id.
50. 172 N.L.R.B. 594 (1968).
51. Id. at 594. The Board concluded that when the employee was invited to
meet with management alone, the company representative had not reached any decision to discipline him but rather was only investigating the events of the preceding
day. Id. at 594-95. The Board therefore concluded that the potential for disciplinary
action was remote and the purpose for the meeting was essentially information gathering. Id. But, as the trial examiner pointed out, the meeting with the employer
never took place and thus the question of whether the proposed interview "was in
effect to deal with him concerning the terms and conditions of employment can never
be established with any certainty." Id. at 599.
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before closing time. 52 The next day the employee found that his time
card had been pulled, a practice which generally signaled discharge
to most employees. 53 The employer requested a meeting with the employee alone later that day, and denied the subsequent request by
both the employee and the union for union representation at that
meeting. 54 Invoking the distinction later elaborated upon by the
Fifth Circuit in Texaco Inc., Houston Producing Division, the Board observed that the meeting was scheduled only for the purpose of investigating the employee's version of the previous day's events, and not for
the purpose of deciding on discipline. 55 In drawing this distinction,
the Board thus ignored the subjective fears which the employee experienced when he saw that his time card had been pulled. Instead,
the Board based its holding on the employer's stated purpose for
56
scheduling the meeting.
After the Fifth Circuit's decision in Texaco, Inc., Houston Producing
Di'vision and the Board's decisions in Chevron Oil Co. and jacobe-Pearson, the employee's right to representation during employer interviews appeared seriously threatened by the distinction between
investigatory and disciplinary interviews. 5 7 As one commentator ob52. Id. at 594. The employee turned back a light repair job received at about
5:35 p.m. which he estimated would require about 45-60 minutes of working time to
complete. Id. Company rules specified employee quitting time at 5:30 p.m. "unless
there is a job to be done and completed by 6 p.m." Id.
53. Id. The Board observed that although, in the minds of the employees, a
pulled time card "generally signaled discharge," there were only two specific instances of discharge following a pulled time card and even the employee admitted
that no one in management had told him of such a practice. Id. The service manager testified that a pulled time card signifies only that management wants to talk to
the employee. Id.
54. Id. at 597-98. The trial examiner observed that the union representative
initally requested permission to represent the employee at the interview because it
might affect the employee's terms and conditions of employment. Id. at 597. When
this request was denied, the union representative asked for permission to be present
at the interview but remain silent in order to serve as a union witness to protect
against false accusations. This request was similarly denied. Id.
55. Id. at 594. The Board noted that the company's service manager and attorney had assured the union that there was no pre-interview decision to discharge the
employee. The Board also observed that the union had been similarly assured by the
company manager that it would be informed of any disciplinary decision reached
and could protest the decision at the bargaining table if it so decided. Id.
56. Id. at 599-600. It is notable that the Board ignored the trial examiner's observations that "the events which occurred after the employee found his time card
missing could only enhance rather than reduce his fear that his job was in jeopardy."
Id. at 599.
57. See Note, Union Presence in Discip/inay Meetings, 41 U. CM. L. REv. 329, 332
(1973) [hereinafter cited as Note, Union Presence]. This commentator noted that the
Board's subsequent attempts after Chevron Oil andjacobe-Pearson to distinguish between investigatory and disciplinary proceedings did not produce "a clear standard."
He suggested that the Board's attempt to restrict the right of union representation to
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served, however, neither the Board nor the courts of appeals were
able to appreciate that this distinction which they had created between investigatory and disciplinary interviews was illusory. 58 The
so-called investigatory interview often served as an indispensable information-gathering tool to corroborate management's version of the
incident under review. 59 Moreover, even when the investigatory
phase of the interview was intended to serve as a neutral, objective
fact-finding process, these meetings nevertheless ultimately assumed a
disciplinary tenor.

60

Recognizing the artificial nature of the distinction between investigatory and disciplinary interviews, the trial examiner in Texaco,
Inc., Los Angeles Sales Terminal 6 formulated a new test for determining
when the employee's right of union representation arose. This test,
which was adopted by the Board, 62 shifted the focus from the employer's professed purpose for the interview to the objective manifestations of this purpose. 63 The controversy leading to the Board's new
test arose when an employee of Texaco refused to drive a truck which
required repair work on certain safety features. 64 Upon his refusal,
disciplinary meetings reflected a concern that a broad recognition of this right would
"unduly disrupt employer operations" in the most routine employer-employee meetings because "[e]mployers would be unable to keep informed on plant operations if
unions were always present to shield their members from criticism." Id. Moreover,
he noted that "[a]n excessively broad right might also interfere with the parties'
§ 9 (a) rights to contract regarding disciplinary procedures." Id. See a/Jo Note, Employee Right to Union Representation During Employer Interrogation, 7 U. TOL. L. REV. 298,
306 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Note, Employee Right to Union Representation]. This
commentator suggested that the Board was also concerned that employers could
never be certain that their assessment of the likelihood of discipline would be accepted without a clearcut distinction between investigatory and disciplinary interviews. Id.
58. See Note, Employee Right to Union Representation, supra note 57, at 306-07. This
commentator suggested that the Board overlooked the fact that in many cases the
employer already had all the information needed for a disciplinary decision and that
the employer held the "fact-finding" interview mainly to confirm these facts. Id. at
306. The author also noted that in a bifurcated procedure (fact-finding session followed by disciplinary interview), the Board was often insensitive to the hardships
which the employee encountered because the second disciplinary interview did not
have all the advantages of a de novo meeting: the employee might have either signed
a statement admitting guilt or provided a damaging record by his own admissions in
the "fact-finding" interview. Id. at 307. A final flaw of this dichotomy between "investigatory" and "disciplinary" interviews is that the Board so expansively defined
"investigatory" interview that it was difficult to find an interview that would not fall
into that category. Id.
59. See id.at 306.
60. Id.
61. 179 N.L.R.B. 976 (1969).
62. Id.
63. Id. at 983.
64. Id. at 978.
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the employee was told "to consider himself suspended," pending a
talk with a supervisor. 65 Both the employee and the union requested
66
the presence of a union official at this talk, but both were refused.
Shortly after this meeting, the employers decided that the employee
should be discharged, a decision which was implemented two days
67
later.
In concluding that the employee's section 8(a)(1) and section
8(a) (5) rights were violated, the trial examiner surveyed recent precedent 68 on the issue and noted, in particular, Texaco, Inc., Houston Producing Di)visIon 69 and Jacobe-Pearson Ford, Inc. 70 The trial examiner
observed that the central premise of these cases-that meetings between employees and employers may be characterized as either factfinding conferences or as record-building conferences designed to justify disciplinary action-created a "false dichotomy. ' 71 Finding that
there were too many situations which did not fall into either of the
two categories, the trial examiner proposed that the conference
should be viewed from the employee's perspective. 72 The trial examiner acknowledged, however, that it was as much a mistake to consider the employee's subjective feelings as it was, under the old test, to
73
consider the employer's professed intentions in calling the meeting.
Accordingly, the trial examiner set forth an objective test which purportedly was based on "recent cases" and stated that the "claimed
statutory rights . . . vest . . . when management's course of conduct

with respect to some job or plant situation provides objective manifestations sufficient reasonably to justify the conclusion that a disciplinary reaction, regarding the concerned worker or workers, will be
forthcoming.

' ' 74

Three years later, the Board made an oblique reference to the
65. Id.
66. Id. at 979. The employee was assured that the only purpose of the meeting
was to get the employee's version of what had taken place and that there was thus no
reason for anyone else to be present. Id.
67. Id. at 979-80.
68. Id. at 981-82.
69. Id. at 982 (citing Texaco, Inc., Houston Producing Division, 168 N.L.R.B.
361 (1967)). For a discussion of Texaco, Inc., Houston Producing Dvision, see notes 22-41
and accompanying text supra.
70. 179 N.L.R.B. at 982 (citing Jacobe-Pearson Ford, Inc., 172 N.L.R.B. 594
(1968)). For a discussion of Jacobe-PearsonFord, see notes 50-56 and accompanying
text supra.
71. 179 N.L.R.B. at 982.
72. Id. at 982-83.
73. Id. at 983.
74. Id. Applying this test, the trial examiner concluded that the employee's
rights were not violated. Id. at 986.
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investigatory/disciplinary distinction 75 in Mobil Oil Corp. 76 although
it shifted its previous emphasis on section 8(a)(5)77 to sections 7 and
8(a)(1) of the Act in its analysis of the employee's right to representation. The controversy in Mobil Oil Corp. arose when five employees
were charged with theft of company property. 7 During interviews
by the employer's security agents, employee requests for union representation were denied. 79 As a result of the information obtained during the security interrogation, the employees were subsequently
80
discharged.
In holding that the employees' statutory rights had not been violated, the trial examiner purported to rely on both sections 8(a)(1)
and 8(a)(5) of the Act."' The trial examiner's observation, however,
that the interviews were not designed to obtain support for pre-determined disciplinary action12 suggests that he primarily relied on the
"terms and conditions of employment," language of section 8(a)(5),
under which the distinction between an investigatory and discipli83
nary interview is crucial.
The Board rejected the trial examiner's opinion and held that
the employer in Mobil Oil Corp. did violate the Act, but that the employer violated sections 7 and 8(a)(1) rather than section 8(a)(5). 4 In
its analysis, the Board nonetheless made reference to the investigatory/disciplinary distinction when it referred to the Board's decision
in Quality ManufacturingCo. 85 and, more specifically, to its statement of
an objective standard for an employee's fears that an interview will
affect his employment status.8 6 This standard was almost identical to
87
the one set by the Board in Texaco, Inc., Los Angeles Sales Terminal.
75. For a discussion of this reference, see note 85 and accompanying text infra.
76. 196 N.L.R.B. 1052 (1972), enforcement denied, 482 F.2d 842 (7th Cir. 1973).
77. See note 24 and accompanying text supra.
78. 196 N.L.R.B. at 1059.
79. Id. at 1058.
80. Id. at 1059.
81. Id. at 1056-60.
82. Id. at 1060.
83. Id. at 1056-60. The Seventh Circuit, on appeal, observed that the decision
of the trial examiner rested primarily on § 8(a)(5) of the Act. Mobil Oil Corp. v.
NLRB, 482 F.2d 842, 844 (7th Cir. 1973).
84. 196 N.L.R.B. at 1052.
85. See id. at 1052 n.3 (citing Quality Mfg. Co., 195 N.L.R.B. 197 (1972)). The
majority in Mobil contended that, contrary to the views of the dissent, they were "not
giving the Union any particular rights with respect to predisciplinary discussions
which it was not otherwise able to secure during collective bargaining negotiations."

Id.
86. Id. at 1052.
87. For a discussion of the standard used by the Board in Texaco, Inc., Los Angeles
Sales Terminal, see notes 61-74 and accompanying text supra.
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In Mobil Oil Corp., the Board arrived at its conclusion that the
employer violated section 7 and 8(a) (1) of the Act through close scrutiny of the language of section 7 regarding an employee's right to
engage in "concerted activities for mutual aid and protection."8 8 It
reasoned that the employer's denial of the employee's request for
union representation resulted in a violation of this right because it
forced the employee to face his employer alone:
Thus, it is a serious violation of the employee's individual
right to engage in concerted activity by seeking the assistance of his statutory representative if the employer denied
the employee's request and compels the employee to appear
unassisted at an interview which may put his job security in
jeopardy. Such a dilution of the employee's right to act collectively to protect his job interests is, in our view, unwarranted interference with his right to insist on concerted
protection, rather than individual self-protection, against
possible adverse employer action.8 9
By disregarding the alleged section 8(a)(5) basis for the cause of action, the Board was able to avoid the difficulties inherent in distinguishing between investigatory and disciplinary interviews.
Rejecting once again the Board's view of the facts, the Seventh
Circuit reversed.9 0 Considering the spirit of section 7 rather-than its
letter, the court denied enforcement of the Board's order. 9 1 It reasoned that section 7 was primarily concerned with the employees'
ability to bring concerted economic pressure to bear on the employer
in furtherance of legitimate objectives. 9 2 Applying this purpose to the
facts of Mob'l 0W1 Corp., the court concluded that "the requested union
representation at an investigatory interview is clearly not the kind of
'concerted activity' with which § 7 is primarily concerned. '93
88. 196 N.L.R.B. at 1052. The Mobil majority concluded that the two employees involved "had reasonable grounds to fear that they were suspected of theft" and
thus, that their requests for union representation at the interview with their employer
were consistent with the § 7 guarantee to employees of a right to engage in mutual
aid and protection. Id.
89. Id.
90. Mobil Oil Corp. v. NLRB, 482 F.2d 842 (7th Cir. 1973).
91. Id. at 848.
92. Id. at 846-47.
93. Id. at 846. For a discussion of the doctrine of concerted constructive activity, see Note, Union Presence, supra note 57, at 336-50; Note, The Requirement of "Concerted" Action under the NLRA, 53 COLUM, L. REV. 514 (1953); Note, Constructive
Concerted Actii'ty and Indi'vidual Rights. The NorthernMetal-InterboroSplit, 121 U. PA. L.
REV. 152 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Note, Constructive Concerted Activity].
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THE QUALITY AND WEINGARTEN DECISIONS

Against this background of Board and appellate decisions that
circumscribed, for the most part, the employee's right to union representation during investigatory interviews with the employer, the
Supreme Court finally addressed this issue and held for the employee
in two companion cases, InternationalLadies' Garment Workers' Uni'on v.
Quah'ty Manufacturtng Co. 4 and NLRB v. Wengarten, Inc. 95 In both

cases, the Court applied the threshold test focusing an employee's objective fears about possible discipline that was first enunciated by the
trial examiner in Texaco, Inc., Los Angeles Sales Terminal to determine
whether the employee's rights were even involved. However, the
Court linked this test to section 8(a)(1) of the Act,9 6 not section
8(a) (5) as the Board had done in Texaco, Inc., Los Angeles Sales Terminal.97 The reasons for the Court's focus on section 8(a)(1) become
apparent from an examination of both Board and appellate decisions
in these two cases.
A.

International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union v. Quality
Manufacturing Company

The Board in Quality Manufacturing Co. 98 began its analysis of the
representation issue by distinguishing several earlier Board decisions,9 9 notably Chevron Oil Co. ,00Jacobe-Pearson Ford,Inc. ,10 and Texaco, Inc., Los Angeles Sales Terminal.10 2 It first observed that the Board
in these three cases had taken the position of refusing to find section
94. 420 U.S. 276 (1975).
95. 420 U.S. 251 (1975).
96. See 420 U.S. at 280-8 1. The Quality Manufacturing Court noted that both the
Fourth Circuit in Quaity Manufacturing and the Fifth Circuit in Weingarten had rejected the Board's contention that a denial of a request for union representation at an
investigatory interview, which the employee reasonably believed might result in disciplinary action, constituted a violation of § 8(a)(l) of the Act. Id. at 277.
97. See text accompanying note 68 supra.
98. 195 N.L.R.B. 197 (1972), enforcement denied, 481 F.2d 1018 (4th Cir. 1973),
rev'd sub nom. International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union v. Quality Mfg. Co.,
420 U.S. 276 (1976). For a discussion of the facts of Quality, see note 2 supra.
99. 195 N.L.R.B. at 198. The focus of the Board's inquiry was upon §§ 8(a)(1)
and 8(a)(3) of the Act and not upon § 8(a)(5) which had been the focus of the cases it
distinguished. Id. The Board also expressly stated that the issue presented by the
discharge in the case before it was not decided by either the Board or the appellate
court in Texaco, Inc., Houston Producing Division, 168 N.L.R.B. 361 (1967), enforcement
denied, 408 F.2d 142 (5th Cir. 1969).
100. For a discussion of Chevron, see notes 43-49 and accompanying text supra.
101. For a discussion ofJacobe-PearsonFord,Inc., see notes 50-56 and accompanying text supra.
102. For a discussion of Texaco, Inc., Los Angeles Sales Temrmial, see notes 61-74
and accompanying text supra.
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8(a)(5) violations in purely investigatory interviews. 0 3 The Board
concluded, however, that these cases were not controlling because
they did not involve the factual situation present in Quahty, where
both the employee and his representative were fired merely for requesting representation.10 4 Another distinguishing characteristic, according to the Board, was that the "section 7 right of individual
employees to act in concert 'for mutual aid and protection' was not
considered in those cases.' 0 5 The Board concluded that it was a
clear violation of an employee's right to be represented by a union if
he was able to exercise his right to representation during an investiga0 6
tory or disciplinary hearing only upon penalty of discharge.'
While the Board appeared to have abandoned the section 8(a)(5)
investigatory/disciplinary approach, or at least to have found it inapplicable in this case, it employed a modified version of it to determine
whether the employee's section 7 rights even arose.' 0 7 The threshold
test it proposed was much like the one proposed by the Board in Texaco, Inc., Los Angeles Sales Terminal:'08 the employee's rights arise
where he "has reasonable grounds to believe that the matters to be
discussed may result in his being the subject of disciplinary action."' 10 9
According to the Board, where such reasonable grounds exist,
participation in the interview is voluntary, unless the employer permits the employee to have a union official attend with him. The employer would therefore violate the Act if he required the employee to
come to the interview unaccompanied by the union official or if he
disciplined him for refusing to attend. The scales, however, were not
tipped completely in the employee's favor. The Board pointed out
that while the employee might be free to forego an interview if the
employer refused to allow representation, the employer would still be
free to take action based on information already uncovered. 1 0 The
Board concluded that the employees discharged in Quality had reason
to believe that disciplinary action would be taken at the interview,
and accordingly, it held that the employer had violated sections 7 and
8(a)(1) of the Act when he discharged these employees upon their
103. 195 N.L.R.B. at 198.
104. Id. While the Board was correct in paraphrasing the focus of the earlier
cases which it proceeded to distinguish, it failed to distinguish or even mention Ross
Gear, which involved the same factual circumstances found in Quality. For a discussion of Ross Gear, see notes 4-16 and accompanying text supra.
105. 195 N.L.R.B. at 198.
106. Id. at 198-99.
107. Id.
108. For a discussion of this test, see note 74 supra.
109. 195 N.L.R.B. at 198.
110. Id. at 198-99.
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request for union representation."'
The Fourth Circuit found the Board's argument without merit,

and therefore denied enforcement of its order.'' 2 In particular, the
court observed that the Board had improperly distinguished precedent. 1 3 Focusing first on the Board's attempt to distinguish prior
cases factually, the Fourth Circuit noted that an implicit, if not explicit, threat of discipline is present in all cases where management
4
directs an employee to cooperate in an investigatory interview.' '
With respect to the Board's attempt to distinguish precedent by legal
argument, the court found the Board's observation that section 7
rights were not considered in previous cases inaccurate.' 1 5 It noted
that section 7 rights were discussed, and found inadequate to support
a right of union representation in the following cases: Ross Gear &
Tool Co. ,116 Dobbs Houses,"11 and Texaco, Inc., Los Angeles Sales Terminal.""a In a footnote, 1 9 the court acknowledged that the Board had
sustained the right to union representation under sections 7 and
8(a)(1) in Mobil Oil Corp. ,12o but then, without distinguishing it, im2
plied that it too had been wrongly decided.' '

The Fourth Circuit's final basis for its denial of enforcement of
the Board's order in Quah'ty was the Board's failure to cite any supporting legislative history. 22 According to the court, the Board's
bald assertion of an employee's right to representation was meritless,
123
because it contained no statutory analysis.
111. Id.
112. NLRB v. Quality Mfg. Co., 481 F.2d 1018 (4th Cir. 1973), rev'd sub nom.
International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union v. Quality Mfg. Co., 420 U.S. 276

(1975),
113. Id. at 1021.
114. Id. at 1024.
115. Id.
116. Id. (citing NLRB v. Ross Gear & Tool Co., 158 F.2d 607 (7th Cir. 1947)).
For a discussion of Ross Gear, see notes 4-16 and accompanying text supra.
117. 481 F.2d at 1021 (citing Dobbs Houses, Inc., 145 N.L.R.B. 1565, 1571
(1964)). For a discussion of Dobbs Houses, see notes 17-21 and accompanying text
supra.
118. 481 F.2d at 1023 (citing Texaco, Inc., Los Angeles Sales Terminal, 179
N.L.R.B. 976, 982 (1969)). For a discussion of Texaco, Inc., Los Angeles Sales Terminial,
see notes 61-74 and accompanying text supra.
119. 481 F.2d at 1023 n.1.
120. 196 N.L.R.B. 1052 (1972). For further discussion of Mobil Oil Corp., see
notes 76-93 and accompanying text supra.
121. 481 F.2d at 1023 n.1.
122. Id. at 1025.
123. Id.
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B.

NLRB v. Weingarten

While the Fourth Circuit was deciding Quality, the Board was
deciding Weingarten, Inc. ,124 a case in which section 8(a)(1) was also
1
cited as the statutory basis for the right of union representation.

25

Factually, Wengarten differed from Quality since the employee was not
discharged merely for requesting representation. 126 In Wengarten, a
store employee was questioned by her supervisor and a security guard
concerning the theft of company property. 127 During the course of
the inquiry, the employee requested several times that her union representative be present, but each request was refused. 28 The employee's responses to questions at the interview were investigated, and
the charges thereafter dropped. 129 The employee then brought a suit

claiming that her section 8(a)(1) rights were violated when her requests for union representation were denied.

30

The Board adopted the Trial Examiner's findings that the employer violated section 8(a)(1), identifying section 7 as the source of
an employee's right to representation.' 3' In reaching this conclusion,
the trial examiner had relied on the Board's Mobil Oil Corp. decision. 132 The Trial Examiner also had relied on the Board's decision
in Quahty and its objective standard for determining whether such
rights arose.' 3 3 Nowhere, however, did the Trial Examiner make his
own independent analysis of Section 7 or apply it to the facts.
The Fifth Circuit denied enforcement of the Board's order in
124. 202 N.L.R.B. 446, enforcement denied, 485 F.2d 1135 (5th Cir. 1973), rev'd sub
nom. NLRB v. Weingarten, 420 U.S. 251 (1975).
125. Id. at 449.
126. See NLRB v. Quality Mfg. Co., 481 F.2d at 1019-20.
127. 202 N.L.R.B. at 448.
128. Id. The employer's representatives claimed that the employee never directly asked for union representation. However, the administrative law judge was
satisfied that the employee's question to the employer asking "shouldn't someone
from the Union be there," was a request for representation. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 446.
131. Id. at 449. The administrative law judge focused upon the language in
Mobil which established the denial of union representation as a serious violation of
the right to engage in "concerted activities" within the meaning of section 7. Id.
(quoting Mobil Oil Corp., 196 N.L.R.B. 1052 (1972), enforcement denied, 482 F.2d 842
(7th Cir. 1973).
132. For a discussion of Mobil Oil Corp., see notes 76-93 and accompanying text
supra.
133. 202 N.L.R.B. at 449. Even though neither of the employer's representatives had the authority to discipline employees, the administrative law judge, relying
upon Quahty, measured the employee's fear of discipline by objective standards.
Viewed in light of this standard, the administrative law judge concluded that the
questioning concerning possible dishonesty was enough for the employee to reasonably believe that her job security was jeopardized. Id.
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Weingarten for a number of reasons. 34 First, it noted that its reliance
on the Mobil Oil Corp. and Quah'ty Board decisions was groundless in
view of the recent decisions by the Seventh and Fourth Circuits, respectively, denying their enforcement.1 35 Secondly, the court reverted to the investigatory/disciplinary distinction characteristic of
earlier decisions involving section 8(a)(5) of the Act and found that
the interview was purely investigatory. 36 Finally, while the Fifth
Circuit acknowledged the Board's contention that the earlier decisions involving this distinction were distinguishable because none of
them relied on section 7, it observed that the Fourth Circuit in Quality
13 7
had both considered and rejected this contention.
C.

The Supreme Court Decisions: Quality and Weingarten

The Supreme Court granted certiorari in both Quahty and We'ngarten and, considering them together, reversed the courts of appeals
in two 6-3 decisions. 13 8 Because the Court in Quah'ty referred to Weingarten for its analysis, 139 this discussion will focus only on Wengarten.
The Weingarten Court began its analysis of the representation issue by sketching the parameters of the Board's decisions in Quahy
and Mobil. The majority initially noted that the right to representation in investigatory interviews was anchored in the language of section 7 guaranteeing employees the right to act in concert for their
mutual aid and protection.140 The Court then identified those condi134. NLRB v. Weingarten, Inc., 485 F.2d 1135 (5th Cir. 1973).
135. Id. at 1137.
136. Id. at 1137. The Fifth Circuit turned its attention to "the nature of the
confrontation" between the employer's representatives and the employee. The court
concluded that there was "no suggestion that the meeting was anything other than a
preliminary fact-finding interview." Id. Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit labelled the
interview "investigatory." Id.
137. Id. Once the interview was labelled investigatory, the Board was faced
with "a long line of Board decisions each of which indicates-either directly or indirectly-that no union representative need be present." Id. Although the Board attempted to distinguish its previous decisions by examining the nature of the
investigative interview, the Fifth Circuit stood by the Qual'ty decision and refused to
accept the proposition that § 8(a)(l) had never been confronted in the context of a
denial of representation at employer interviews. Therefore, the Fifth Circuit followed
previous precedent and declined to afford the right to union representation. Id. In a
closing paragraph, the Fifth Circuit stated that the employee must demonstrate that
an employer's purpose was intended to go beyond fact-finding with the specific intent
to "impose disciplinary measures upon the employee so that grievance hearings later
on would merely put the seal on the employer's judgment." Id. at 1138.
138. 420 U.S. at 251; 420 U.S. at 276.
139. 420 U.S. at 281. The Quahit Court held that its decision in Wengarten
"clearly requires reversal" of the court of appeals decisions denying enforcement of a
§ 8(a)(1) violation and remedial order. Id.
140. 420 U.S. at 256. The denial of the right to act in concert for mutual aid
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tions which the Board imposed for the exercise of the right to representation and it concluded that an employee must request the
representation and also reasonably believe that the investigation will
result in disciplinary action.' 4' Finally, the majority examined the
Board-defined limitations on the right to union representation. The
employer need not justify a refusal to permit representation and may
take action based upon information from other sources if the employee declines to be interviewed without representation. 1 42 Additionally, the employer has no duty to bargain with any union
143
representative present at an investigatory interview.
After reviewing the Quah'ty and Mobil Board decisions, the
Supreme Court declared the Board's holding "a permissible construction of [section 7] by the Agency charged with enforcement of the
Act" which should have been sustained. 144 Although the language of
section 7 covers "concerted activities," Justice Brennan did not interpret it as creating an impediment to the single employee who wished
to avail himself of its protection. Instead, Justice Brennan offered a
dynamic interpretation of section 7 in which the rights of the individual employee are intimately linked to the rights of the union as a
whole. Thus, when a single employee seeks union representation,
"[t]he union representative whose participation he seeks is . . .safeguarding not only the particular employee's interest, but also the interests of the entire bargaining unit by exercising vigilance to make
certain that the employer does not initiate or continue a practice of
and protection "has a reasonable tendency to interfere with, restrain, and coerce employees" and therefore constitutes a violation of § 8(a)(1). Id. at 257 (quoting Mobil
Oil Corp., 196 N.L.R.B. 1052 (1972)).
141. Id. at 257. The employee may choose to attend the interview without
union representation thereby waiving his or her § 7 right. Id. Furthermore, the
Board did not want the right to inure to "run of the mill shop-floor conversations,"
and therefore imposed an objective standard for measuring an employee's fear of
disciplinary action. Id. See Quality Mfg. Co., 195 N.L.R.B. 197, 198 n.3 (1972)
("reasonable ground" measured by objective standards); NLRB v. Gissel Packing
Co., 395 U.S. 575, 608 (1969) (an inquiry into an employee's subjective motivations
involves "an endless and unreliable inquiry").
142. 420 U.S. at 258.
143. Id. at 259-60. In drawing a distinction between investigatory and disciplinary interviews, the Board was no longer concerned with the right to the presence of
a union representative at either hearing but only with the degree of union involvement in the proceeding. Id. In investigative interviews where an employee reasonably fears discipline, the employer need not meet or negotiate with the
representative. Id. at 260. The union representative is only present to assist the employee and clarify facts. Id. In disciplinary interviews, however, the employer has a
"mandatory affirmative obligation" to meet with union representatives. Id. (citing
Jacobe-Pearson Ford, Inc., 172 N.L.R.B. 594 (1968); Chevron Oil Co., 168 N.L.R.B.
574 (1967); Texaco, Inc., Houston Producing Div., 168 N.L.R.B. 361 (1967)).
144. Id. at 260.
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imposing punishment."1 4 5 Moreover, this construction of section 7
was consistent with the Act's purpose of eliminating the inequality in

146
bargaining power between the employee and employer.
Finally, acknowledging that the Board's decision in Wethgarten
was contrary to some of the Board's own precedents, 14 7 the Court remarked that it was proper for administrative agencies to take an "evolutionary approach," rather than to follow, unquestioningly, prior
decisions.' 4 8 It was inappropriate, the Court emphasized, for the
court of appeals to interfere with the Board's role by making its own

determination of an employee's "need" for union assistance at an investigatory interview: "It is the province of the Board, not the courts,
to determine whether or not the "need" exists in light of changing

industrial practices and the Board's cumulative experience in dealing
1 49
with labor-management relations."

The dissenting Justices were primarily concerned with what they
perceived as the abrupt shift in Board policy without an adequate
explanation of its interpretation of section 7. Chief Justice Burger

was not so much troubled with the Board's new rule as with the ab145. Id. at 260-61.
146. Id. at 261-62. Within an investigatory interview, the Court was concerned
that "[a] single employee confronted by an employer investigating whether certain
conduct deserves discipline may be too fearful or inarticulate to relate accurately the
incident being investigated, or too ignorant to raise extenuating factors." Id. at 26263. The majority also suggested that the presence of a union representative could aid
the employer "by eliciting favorable facts and . . . getting to the bottom of the incident occasioning the interview." Id. at 263. The Court rejected the employer's contention that representation is unnecessary at the investigatory stage due to the later
chance to correct any errors in a disciplinary proceeding. Id. Justice Brennan declared "[a]t that point, however, it becomes increasingly difficult for the employee to
vindicate himself, and the value of representation is correspondingly diminished."
Id. at 263-64.
147. See, e.g., Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 192 N.L.R.B. 834 (1971); Texaco, Inc., Los
Angeles Sales Terminal, 179 N.L.R.B. 976 (1969); Wald Mfg. Co., 176 N.L.R.B. 839
(1969), affd, 426 F.2d 1328 (6th Cir. 1970); Dayton Typographic Serv., Inc., 176
N.L.R.B. 357 (1969); Jacobe-Pearson Ford, Inc., 172 N.L.R.B. 594 (1968); Chevron
Oil Co., 168 N.L.R.B. 574 (1967); Dobbs Houses, Inc., 145 N.L.R.B. 1565 (1964).
148. 420 U.S. at 265. In supporting the Board's "evolutionary approach," the
majority recognized that representation problems are not susceptible to "a quick definitive formula as a comprehensive answer;" instead, these problems required the
Board to "more or less [feel] its way." Id. at 265 (quoting Electrical Workers v.
NLRB, 366 U.S. 667, 674 (1961)).
149. Id. at 266. Fundamentally, the Court believed that the Board, not the
courts, should perform the "special function of applying the general provisions of the
Act to the complexities of life" due to the Board's special competence in the field of
labor relations. Id. (quoting NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221, 236 (1963)).
Even though an interpretation "may not be required by the Act," the majority concluded that so long as the interpretation is permissible and the Board is balancing the
conflicting interests of management and labor, the Board's decision is subject only to
limited judicial review. Id. at 266-67.
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sence of a cogent Board rationale. As he explained in dissent, "[t]he
tortured history and inconsistency of the Board's efforts in this difficult area suggest the need for an explanation by the Board of why the
50
new rule was adopted."'
Justice Powell's dissent expressed concern that the Board's interpretation of section 7 was not altogether supported by its interpretation of previous opinions.' 5' More importantly, Justice Powell
maintained that the Board impermissibly intruded into the elementary prerogatives of management to discharge and discipline
52
employees. 1
Examining the scope of section 7 of the Act, Justice Powell concluded that "concerted activity" was intended by Congress to reach
only the rights of employees as a group to organize, exact concessions,
153
and have a voice in management decisions affecting employees.
Representation of the individual employee was a subject for collective
bargaining, Justice Powell maintained, not a right which Congress
intended to come within the purview of section 7.154
150. Id. at 268-69 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). Justice Burger emphasized that
"'[w]hen the Board so exercises the discretion given to it by Congress, it must 'disclose the basis of its order' and 'give clear indication that it has exercised the discretion with which Congress has empowered it.'" Id. at 269 (Burger, CJ., dissenting)
(citation omitted). The Chief Justice wanted to remand the case to the Board so it
could justify its change in policy, "rather than leave with this Court the burden of
justifying the change for reasons which we arrive at by inference and surmise." Id.
151. Id. at 271-72 (Powell, J., dissenting). Justice Powell traced the Board's decisions from Dobb's Houses to Quality, concluding that the change in direction did not
result from an "evolutional" approach based upon "significant developments of industrial life." Id. Rather, Justice Powell viewed the Board decisions as inconsistent,
and as changing the basis of decision from one distinction to another. Id. at 272
(Powell, J., dissenting).
152. Id. at 273 (Powell, J., dissenting). Justice Powell stated:
An employer's need to consider and undertake disciplinary action will arise
in a wide variety of unpredictable situations. The appropriate disciplinary
response also will vary significantly, depending on the nature and severity
of the employee's conduct. Likewise, the nature and amount of information
required for determining the appropriateness of disciplinary action may
vary with the severity of the possible sanction and the complexity of the
problem. And in some instances, the employer's legitimate need to maintain discipline and security may require an immediate response.
Id. at 274 (Powell, J., dissenting).
153. Id. at 273 (Powell, J., dissenting).
154. Id. at 272-73 (Powell, J., dissenting). Justice Powell offered a different perspective of the goal of the National Labor Relations Act. Id. In his opinion, the Act
"only creates the structure for the parties' exercise of their respective economic
strengths; it leaves definition of the precise contours of the employment relationship
to the collective-bargaining process." Id. at 273 (citing Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S.
99, 108 (1970) (results of collective bargaining are best left to the bargaining
strengths of the parties); NLRB v. American Nat'l Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395, 402 (1952)
(the Act imposes only the obligation to bargain collectively and does not require any
agreement between employer and employee)). Therefore, Justice Powell read section
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Weingarten was a watershed decision, perhaps creating as many
ancillary problems as it resolved. Exceptions to application of the
rule quickly arose.' 55 Because of the Supreme Court's failure to define adequately the contours of its original decision, it becomes important to appreciate how the newly developed representation rule
has been recently applied in subsequent lower court decisions.
IV.

THE POST-WEINGARTEN EXPERIENCE:

AN APPLIED

ANALYSIS

A.

Emp/oyer Notification of Pre-DeterminedDisczphne or Warning

Although many of the post-Wengarten cases have upheld an employee's right to representation, and even expanded the right, 56 in
several particular areas the courts have limited or denied the right.
Most of these cases have dealt with a unique set of facts which have
enabled courts to circumvent the dictates of Wengarten.
One such case was Mount Vernon Tanker Co. v. NLRB,157 where the
Ninth Circuit confronted the issue of the employee's right to representation in a maritime context. In Mount Vernon, a ship captain determined that a ship employee had refused a direct order to leave the
engine room after he was discovered "loafing."' ' 58 Under the prescribed disciplinary procedures, the employee's act was to be "logged"
into the captain's record.' 59 The seaman refused to attend the logging procedure without his union representative, despite the captain's
insistence that logging was not a union matter. 60 When the seaman
remained steadfast in his refusal to submit to the logging procedure
without representation, he was taken below, confined to the ship's
hospital, and placed on a diet of bread and water "until his disobedience ceased."' 6 ' In addition, the employee was fined twenty days'
7 as protecting "those rights that are essential to employee self-organization and to
the exercise of economic weapons to exact concessions from management ....
It
does not define those terms itself." Id. at 273 (Powell, J., dissenting). The existence
of union representation clauses in collective bargaining agreements led Justice Powell
to conclude that Congress meant to leave the right to union representation to the
collective bargaining process. Md.at 275 (Powell, J., dissenting).
155. For a discussion of some exceptions, see notes 157-96 and accompanying
text infra.
156. See notes 266-85 and accompanying text infra.
157. 549 F.2d 571 (9th Cir. 1977).
158. Id. at 572.
159. Id. See 46 U.S.C. § 702 (1976).
160. 549 F.2d at 572.
161. Id. at 573.
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16 2
wages, and subsequently placed on probation for eighteen months.
The Board in Mount Vernon applied Weingarten and concluded
that the logging proceeding was one which an employee might reasonably fear would result in discipline; it therefore held that the employer had violated the employee's section 8(a)(l) rights.' 63 The
Ninth Circuit, finding Wengarten inapposite, denied enforcement of
the Board's order. 1 64 The court circumvented the Weingarten mandates with two different arguments. First, although it acknowledged
that under Weingarten employees are entitled to union representation
during investigatory interviews, the Ninth Circuit distinguished Mount
Vernon by noting that the logging proceeding was qualitatively different from an investigatory interview.16 5 A logging proceeding, according to the court, is not conducted to ascertain guilt or innocence of
the seamen charged with the offense. Rather, the logging procedure
serves only to notify the seaman of the charges brought against him,
and commences only after the ship's captain has determined the guilt
of the crew member.166 This distinction represents a return to a preWeingarten analysis. Just as the distinction between investigatory and
disciplinary interviews was determinative of the existence of a right to
representation in the pre-Webigarten cases, so, too, here is the distinction between investigatory and noninvestigatory interviews determinative of the same right.
The Ninth Circuit also distinguished Weingarten by emphasizing
the maritime context in which Mount Vernon arose. 167 In particular,
the court suggested that the imbalance of power.in favor of a ship
captain was necessary as a matter of disciplinary control in this special environment:

162. Id.
163. Mount Vernon Tanker Co., 218 N.L.R.B. 1423 (1975).

164. 549 F.2d 571 (9th Cir. 1977).
165. Id. at 574.
166. Id. at 571. The Fifth Circuit stated:
The result at the outset is a foregone conclusion; from the outset, all that
remains to be accomplished is the formality or ceremony itself and the notice to the seaman that results. The proceeding is mandated by law and the
captain, as master of the ship, cannot exercise the employer's usual prerogative to dispense with [sic] interview.

Id.
167. Id. at 575-76. The Fifth Circuit distinguished Weingarlen on the basis of the
statutory authorization for the logging procedure. Id. at 575. "Concerted activities,"
according to the Fifth Circuit, were not meant to hinder the ability of a ship captain
to maintain strict discipline while at sea. Furthermore, the court suggested that the
Board did not have the ability to correct the imbalance of power in favor of the ship
captain during the voyage, noting that other labor activities permissable in the industrial setting, such as a strike, can even constitute a crime aboard ship. Id.
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[L]abor practices appropriate in the normal industrial context can be wholly inappropriate at sea, and it may be
doubted that concerted activities of seamen for mutual aid
or protection, when in opposition to the directions of a ship's
master, are to be tolerated at all during the course of a
68
voyage. 1
Read broadly, Mount Vernon could stand for the proposition that
the Weingarten right to representation does not attach when the employer conducts a proceeding simply to notify an employee of disciplinary action. However, since the Ninth Circuit also based its decision
on the unique nature of the maritime context, it is possible to read
Mount Vernon much more narrowly.
A year and a half after Mount Vernon was decided, however, the
Ninth Circuit chose to construe Mount Vernon broadly when it confronted similar facts in Alfred M. Lewis v. NLRB. 169 Although the
court upheld the Board's decision that Weingarten rights did obtain
during employee counseling sessions at which the employer questioned employees on their failure to meet certain quotas, 70 it denied
enforcement of the Board's decision that these rights obtained (and
were violated) during sessions called for the purpose of explaining
pending disciplinary action. 7 ' Central to the court's decision regarding the second type of meeting was its view that the employee's Wengaren rights were triggered only by interrogation, which warranted a
union official's protective role. 17 2 The Ninth Circuit based its view on
168. Id.
169. 587 F.2d 403 (9th Cir. 1978). In Lewis, the employees were "order runners" who drove lift trucks in a warehouse. Id. at 405-06. The employer recognized
that for several years, the performance of the employees at one warehouse was consistently worse than that of order runners at other company warehouses. Id. at 406.
For several months, the employer attempted to counsel employees concerning their
poor work habits, and quantitatively measured the output of these workers. When
this program failed to provide satisfactory results, the employer imposed disciplinary
procedures. When several employees were discharged pursuant to the new procedures, the union opted for arbitration. During the pendency of arbitration, the company adopted a policy forbidding union representation at counseling and
disciplinary sessions. Id.
170. Id. at 410. Relying upon the Board's decision, the Ninth Circuit viewed
the presence of a union representative at counseling sessions "of obvious benefit to the
employee," especially where collective bargaining had been improperly denied and
"the atmosphere of intimidation and uncertainty was heightened and the justification for the fear that the interview would be used in significant part for disciplinary
purposes was increased." Id. Summarizing the holding in Wengarten, the Ninth Circuit stated: "The right of representation arises when a significant purpose of the interview is to obtain facts to support disciplinary action that is probable or that is
being seriously considered." Id.
171. Id. at 410-11.
172. Id. at 411. The court noted that "[a]t the disciplinary sessions involved in
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the "investigatory interview" language used in Werngarten. 173
The Ninth Circuit had the opportunity to reevaluate its decision
in Lewis dealing with the "investigatory" language of Weingarten in
NLRB v. Certified Grocers of Califom'a .174 The controversy in Certified
Grocers arose when an employee received a written warning regarding
his low productivity, followed by an oral warning that he would be
laid off if his production did not increase appreciably.17 5 In a subsequent meeting, the employee requested and was denied union representation and received a two week disciplinary suspension.1 76 In
response to both the employer's and the dissent's contention that the
mandates of Weingarlen were inapplicable to a meeting like that in
Certified Grocers where there was no questioning of the employee, the
Board held that Wengarten drew its bounds only at "run-of-the-mill
shop floor conversations involving instructions, corrections, or training," and nowhere excluded noninvestigatory interviews. 177
this case, the employees were simply informed of the disciplinary action to be taken.
At such a meeting, absent any interrogation, the protective role of union representation envisioned by Weingarten is not applicable." Id.
173. Id. The Ninth Circuit also noted that "[c]ompelled participation by the
employe[e] is thus necessary before the right to representation is implicated under
Weingarten." id.
174. 587 F.2d 449 (9th Cir. 1978).
175. Certified Grocers of Cal., 227 N.L.R.B. 1211, 1211-12 (1977), enforcement
denied, 587 F.2d 449 (9th Cir. 1978). The employee worked at a warehouse which
distributed food and related products. Id. at 1211.
176. Id. The Board found that "[t]he purpose of the meeting. . . was to deliver
the written warning notice to [the employee]." Id. at 1212. The supervisor conducting the hearing "had no authority to modify or withhold the issuance of the
warning notice." Id.
177. Id. at 1214-15. The majority initially concluded that the employee reasonably feared discipline because of the circumstances leading to the issuance of the
disciplinary layoff notice. Id. at 1213. After this finding, the Board majority addressed the dissent's contention that Wengarten applied only to "investigatory" interviews where a union representative plays a useful role in the proceedings. Id. at 121617 (Walther, Member, dissenting). The majority first pointed out language in Wezngarten referring to both "interviews" and "investigatory interviews." Id. at 1214. Secondly, the majority noted that the dissent relied not upon Wengarten, but upon a
Second Circuit decision for the proposition that only investigatory interviews confer
the right to union representation. Id. See NLRB v. Columbia Univ., 541 F.2d 922
(2d Cir. 1976). Finally, the majority did not accept the argument that the presence
of a union representative at a purely disciplinary meeting was useless. 227 N.L.R.B.
at 1219. According to the majority, "the role of the union representative is to assist
the employee and to observe what, if any, bearing any such meeting might have on
the interests of the other employees in the unit." Id.
It should be noted that the Board itself overturned Certified Grocers in Baton
Rouge Water Works Co., 246 N.L.R.B. 995 (1979). In Baton Rouge, the Board reasoned that Certifed Grocers was "wrongly decided on the facts" and therefore held that
"an employee has no section 7 right to the presence of his union representative at a
meeting with his employer held solely for the purpose of informing the employee of,
and acting upon, a previously made disciplinary decision." Id. at 997. The Board
was careful to point out, however, that its holding did not cover every disciplinary
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Relying on Mount Vernon and Albert M. Lewis, and their "interrogation" rationales, the Ninth Circuit in NLRB v. Certified Grocers denied enforcement of the Board's decision.' 78 The court observed that
the purpose of the meeting was only to deliver a warning, not to investigate facts; it thus concluded that Weingarten did not apply. 179 In
doing so, however, the court shifted the focus from the employee's
fears back to the employer's professed purpose for the meeting.
B.

The Employer's Weingarten Choice Allowing Representation or
Ending the Interview

In addition to the controversy surrounding Wengarten's reference
to "investigatory interviews," another issue that has arisen is the
Supreme Court's limitation in Weingarten on the scope of the employee's right to representation. In Weingarten, the Court stated that
when an employee requests representation, the employer is obligated
18 0
to either permit representation, or to put an end to the interview.
If the employer chooses to end the interview the employer may still
bring disciplinary action without the benefit of the interview, as long
as it is fully supported by the facts. 18 1 Invoking this limitation, the
NLRB General Counsel in New England Telephone and Telegraph Co. 182
dismissed the employee's charge that the employer had violated sec183
tion 7 of the Act.
The controversy arose in New England Telephone after an employee reported late to his job site. When the employee was questioned by his supervisor about the reason for his tardiness, the
employee asked for representation. 184 At that point, the supervisor
ceased his questioning and arranged for him to be driven back to the
principal work site, whereupon the employee was suspended for the
interview. Id. According to the majority, if the employer "engages in any conduct
beyond merely informing the employee of a previously made disciplinary decision,
the full panoply of protections accorded the employee under Wemngarten may be applicable." Id.
178. 587 F.2d at 450.
179. Id. at 451 (citing Alfred M. Lewis, Inc. v. NLRB, 587 F.2d 403 (9th Cir.
1978); Mount Vernon Tanker Co. v. NLRB, 549 F.2d 571 (9th Cir. 1977); NLRB v.
Columbia Univ., 541 F.2d 922 (2d Cir. 1976)).
180. 420 U.S. at 258.
181. Id. at 258-59.
182. 95 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1530 (1977) (NLRB Gen. Coun. Ad. Mem. No. 1-CA12879).
183. Id. This case was dismissed on the basis of an advice memoranda; consequently the Board never considered the merits of the case.
184. Id. at 1531. There had been a history of poor relations between the employee and the supervisor, which led the employee to anticipate potential disciplinary
action and thus immediately request union representation. Id.
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rest of the day.' 85 The General Counsel acknowledged that the employee's right to representation arose at his initial confrontation with
his employer, 8 6 but impliedly suggested that the employer's obligation to permit representIation was thereafter immediately discharged
8 7
by suspending his questioning and plans for any future interviews.
Although this limitation on an employee's right to representation
is consistent with Wetngarten's express language, 8 New England Telegraph demonstrates the harsh effect of this limitation on the employee. The employee is left with the choice of either waiving his
right to representation during the interview or relying solely on the
employer's benevolence without an interview. If the rest of Weingarten's mandates are to be carried out in any meaningful way, the
employer should be obligated to continue the interview and to honor
the employee's request for representation.
C. Employer Pre-Interview Assurance of No Disciphnay Action
Employers have also sought to circumvent Weingarten by providing employees with assurances prior to or during interviews that no
disciplinary action will follow. This was the tactic successfully used
by the employer in Amoco Chemicals Corp. 189 In that case, the employer decided to institute a counseling program for employees who
had high absentee records. 19' In preparation for the program, the
employer circulated a communication explaining that a counseling
session was not a disciplinary session, and that consequently no union
representatives were permitted.' 9 ' Oral assurances that discipline
would not occur were also given at the beginning of each counseling
session. Two employees challenged the rule set down by the communication after they were denied union representation when they were
185. Id.
186. The General Counsel found that the employee clearly had reasonable
grounds to fear that the meeting would entail disciplinary action. Id. at 1531. Wngarten guarantees the right to representation at the outset of such a confrontation. See
420 U.S. at 260.
187. 95 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1531 (citing NLRB v. Weingarten, 420 U.S. 251
(1974); Certified Grocers of Cal., 227 N.L.R.B. 1211 (1977)).
188. See 420 U.S. at 258. The Wegarten Court preserved the employer's prerogative to dispense with the interview and use alternate means to resolve the disciplinary problem. See id. at 258-59. For further discussion of this limitation, see note 142
and accompanying text supra.
189. 237 N.L.R.B. 394 (1978).
190. Id.
191. Id. at 395. The communication also directed the supervisors to inform employees at the start of the interview that the session was not disciplinary in nature.
Reports of the session were not filed in employee's personnel records, but were kept in
a separate file. Id.

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol28/iss3/3

28

Gregory: The Employee's Right to Representation during Employer Investigat
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 28: p. 572

called in individually to attend counseling sessions for their excessive
absenteeism. 192 Neither at the sessions themselves, nor subsequently,
was either employee disciplined. 193
The Board adopted the trial examiner's decision, and thus dismissed the employees' complaint alleging that the employer had violated section 8(a)(1). 194 The Trial Examiner based his decision on the
premise that the advance notice by the employer that the counseling
sessions were not disciplinary in nature removed any reasonable
grounds for believing that disciplinary action would follow. 195
While Amoco may be consistent with Weingarten's principles, it is
arguably inconsistent with the collective bargaining agreement that
was in force between the union and the employer. The agreement
contained a provision under which the union agreed to use best efforts to reduce absenteeism. 196 It would seem only logical, then, that
the employer would have welcomed, rather than resisted, total involvement by the union in the counseling program.
D.

The Employee's Right to Choose a Specijic Union Official
as Representative

One aspect of the employee's right to union representation about
which Weingarten was silent was the employee's right to choose a specific union official to accompany him to an employer interview. The
Board confronted this issue in Coca-Cola Bottling Co. ,'97 and decided
that Weingarten did accord the right to insist on a specific representative. 19 8 The issue arose when the employer requested to speak to an
employee, who then requested representation by his shop steward. 199
After the employer explained to the employee that the steward was
on vacation and that it was unnecessary to wait for his return, 20 0 the
employer began questioning the employee on his alleged misconduct.
192. Id. at 396.
193. Id. at 395. The employer's policy was to permit union representation at
any subsequent interviews in which employees were given warnings about their absenteeism. Records of the initial interviews were not referred to in action taken as a
result of continued absences after the counseling interview. Id.
194. Id. at 394.
195. Id. at 397.
196. Id. at 394.
197. 227 N.L.R.B. 1276 (1977).

198. Id. The Board found nothing in Wengarten to suggest that an employer
must postpone an interview because a specific union official requested by the employee is unavailable or that it is the employer's obligation to suggest or provide an
alternate representative. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 1276. It is undisputed that the employee knew that the union official
was away on vacation at the time he requested the steward's presence. Id. The ad-
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Thereafter, the employer handed the employee a disciplinary action
notice to sign. 20 1 The employee refused to sign it. Alleging that he
was effectively denied the right to union representation, the employee
brought this action based on sections 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(5).2 0 2 The
Board, however, took a different view of the facts. It observed that

the employer never denied the employee's request for representation,
but rather "was simply unable to comply with it. ' ' 2 ° 3 In observing
further that We'ngarlen does not oblige an employer to postpone an
interview until the requested union representative is available, the
Board relied upon that portion of We'ngarten which stated that an

employee, through the exercise of his rights, could not "interfere with
legitimate employer prerogatives. ' '20 4 Nevertheless, while denying
that the employer had any obligation to secure an alternative representative, 20 5 the Board implied in dictum that the employee's rights
would have been violated had he subsequently requested an alternative representative and been denied representation. 20 6 Furthermore,
in response to a dissenting Board member's view that the employer's
refusal to postpone the meeting amounted to compulsion to attend it
without any representation, the Board stated that the employee could
have requested representation by another union official.20 7 Yet, noministrative law judge found no evidence that the supervisor timed the interview in
order to avoid the steward's presence. Id. at 1280 n.5.
201. Id. at 1278. The disciplinary action notice listed instances of employee misconduct and warned that failure to improve would result in further disciplinary action. The plaintiff employee was specifically reprimanded for wasting time during
his shift, for insubordinate conduct, and for failing to make necessary repairs. Id.
202. Id. at 1276.
203. Id. There was evidence that the employer had complied with this employee's request for representation at a similar prior interview. However, the two
dissenting members of the Board argued that regardless of the employer's willingness
to comply with the request, the employer simply could not, without violating the
principles announced in Weingarten, compel an unassisted, unrepresented employer to
participate in an interview after a request for representation had been made. Id. at
1277 (Fanning & Jenkins, Members, dissenting).
204. Id. at 1276 (citing NLRB v. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. at 258). The Board
then characterized the right to hold investigatory interviews without delay as a legitimate employer prerogative. Id.
It is not clear, however, that this is a correct inference based on the quoted
language from Webngarten. Following its statement that legitimate employer prerogatives should not be infringed upon, the Court referred only to the employer's prerogative to forego the interview entirely and act on the basis of information from other
sources. 420 U.S. at 258-59. There is no indication in the Court's discussion that one
such prerogative is to proceed without delay with the very interview at issue.
205. 227 N.L.R.B. at 1276. See also Roadway Express, Inc., 246 N.L.R.B. 1127
(1979); Crown Zellerbach, Inc., 239 N.L.R.B. 1124 (1978).
206. 227 N.L.R.B. at 1276.
207. Id. at 1276 n.6. The trial examiner pointed out that the union could have
safeguarded the employee's interests simply by designating an alternate steward to
substitute for the steward on vacation, or that the employee could have requested the

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol28/iss3/3

30

Gregory: The Employee's Right to Representation during Employer Investigat
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 28: p. 572

where did the Board or trial examiner state whether the employee
had an opportunity to do so. 20 The administrative law judge (ALJ)
stated only that under Weingarten it was up to the employee to request
alternative representation.
E.

20 9

The Dubious Validzy of Union Waiver of the Employee's
Rzght to Representation

Perhaps one of the most troubling post-Weingarten issues that has

arisen is the possibility of a union's contractual waiver, through its
collective bargaining agreement, of an employee's right to representation. This issue confronted the Board in New York Telephone Co. 210 In

this case, a union originally proposed to add to its contract a written
provision extending an employee's right to representation to any occasion where an employee requested it,21I but ultimately, in settlement of a strike, the union agreed to a contract containing a provision
allowing representation only at meetings where final disciplinary action was to be taken. 21 2 The Board expressly declined to state
21 3
whether an employee's right to representation may ever be waived,
but it held that under the facts of this case the union's execution of
the agreement in settlement of a strike did not constitute a waiver of
the employees' rights to representation. 21 4 The Board offered little
explanation for its holding. It did observe, however, perhaps by way
presence of the union business agent, who, according to the record, was close by and
presumably available. The employee testified that he did not do so because it was
customary for the shop steward rather than the business agent to represent employees
in these interviews. Id. at 1280.
208. The trial examiner refused to credit the employer's testimony that he specifically told the employee that he could have any other available union representative attend the meeting. Id. at 1279 n.4. The examiner found, based on the
employee's testimony, that no such offer was made. Id.
209. Id. at 1280 n.6. The trial examiner and the Board reasoned that it was the
employee's request which initially triggered the right to representation under Wezhgarten, and in a situation where an alternate representative had to be found, it remained the employee's burden to ask for the alternate's presence. Id. From the
dissent's perspective, however, Wengarten only requires that the employee ask for representation, and to place any additional burden on the employee is to negate the
purpose of Weingarten-to aid the employee, unskilled in the "niceties of procedure."
Id. at 1277 (Fanning & Jenkins, Members, dissenting).
210. 219 N.L.R.B. 679 (1975).
211. Id. at 679. At the time this request was made, the employer had a practice
of granting representation rights to employees in only the following circumstances:
1) when the matter could result in criminal prosecution; 2) when the employer intended to discipline the employee at the specific meeting; and 3) when the employee
was currently under discipline. Id.
212. Id. at 680.
213. Id. at 679 n.7.
214. Id. at 680.
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of justification, that the union had repeated its demands regarding
the employee representation and at no time retreated from its
2 15
position.
The ALJ,whose conclusion the Board adopted, was less cursory
in his analysis. He stated that while the union remained silent about
the provision regarding employee rights to representation when it accepted the contract, its silence could not be viewed as consent, because the union had no affirmative duty to speak. 21 6 Interpreting the
union's silence as a decision to "rely on Board law to take care of
those situations to which the contract provision did not apply, '2 17 the
ALJ concluded that the case was clearly distinguishable from one
where a conscious waiver takes place during bargaining. 218
The Board's New York Telephone Co. decision apparently posed no
obstacle to the General Counsel in United States PostalService ,219 where,
in an advice memorandum, it dismissed section 8(a)(1) charges for
violation of an employee's right to representation after finding that
this right had been waived by the union in its collective bargaining
agreement with the employer. 220 The General Counsel nowhere alluded to New York Telephone Co. or to its reasoning.
As an advice memorandum rather than a Board decision, United
States Postal Service has considerably less precedential value than New
York Telephone. In light of Weingarten's emphasis on the rights of the
individual employee, 221 the bargaining representative should not be
permitted to waive, through its collectively bargained contract, the
statutory rights of the union's individual constituents.
F. Right to Consultation with Employee Representative Priorto the
Investigatory Interview
In Chmax Molybedenum Co. ,22 the Board extended the employee's
right to union representation to pre-interview consultation with a
union official. The Tenth Circuit, however, denied enforcement of
the Board's order and concluded that Weingarten could not be read so
215. Id.

216. Id. at 682.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. 93 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1335 (1976) (NLRB Gen. Coun. Ad. Mem. No. 7-CA12870).
220. Id. The contract provided that, "[ftor a minor offense, counseling in private shall be the method of dealing with the offense. Counseling is a private matter
between the supervisor and the employer." Id.
221. See notes 145-46 and accompanying text supra.
222. 227 N.L.R.B. 1189, enforcement denzed, 584 F.2d 360 (10th Cir. 1978).
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2 23

broadly.

In Ch'max, the source of the employee's right to union representation at interviews lay not only in precedent but also in the particular
collective bargaining agreement between the employer and the
union. 224 Following an argument between two employees, the foreman in charge notified the union grievance representative to appear
for an investigation of the incident. 22 5 The union grievance representative then requested permission to speak with the two employees in
advance of the investigatory meeting, but the employer denied the
request stating that the representative would have ample opportunity
to speak with the employees during the interview itself.2 26 Although

the union's request for pre-interview consultation was denied, the representative was present during the actual interview. As a result of the
proceeding, both employees received oral warnings. 227
In a three to two decision, the Board held that the employer violated section 8(a)(l) of the Act when it refused to permit the union to
consult with the employees prior to an investigatory meeting which
an employee might reasonably believe could result in disciplinary action.2 28 In so holding, the Board concluded that the Wengarten right
"includes the right of the employee to confer with the union represen29
tative before the interview. 2
In support of its holding, the Board quoted a portion of the Wengarten opinion in which the Supreme Court discussed the utility of a
union representative's presence at an investigatory meeting. According to the court, a "knowledgeable union representative" could help
223. Climax Molybedenum Co. v. NLRB, 584 F.2d 360, 363 (10th Cir. 1978).
224. 227 N.L.R.B. at 1189. The bargaining agreement provided that a union
representative had the right to be present whenever an employee was subject to any
employer action that could affect his employment record or result in discipline or
discharge. Id. The pertinent portion of the contract stated that "[a] Vice-President
or his designee shall be present during any subsequent formal investigation which
might result in discipline or discharge." Id. The parties stipulated that the interview
at issue was a "formal investigation" within the meaning of the bargaining agreement. Id.
225. Id. The employer apparently notified the union representative as part of
the disciplinary procedure established under the bargaining contract. 584 F.2d at
361. On appeal, the Tenth Circuit noted that the employees neither requested the
union representative's presence at the disciplinary session, nor requested to talk to the
representative prior to the interview. Id. at 363.
226. 227 N.L.R.B. at 1189. Reviewing the record, the Tenth Circuit found that
the union representative was not even informed of the employees' names or of the
nature of the altercation giving rise to the investigation which he was noticed to
attend. 584 F.2d at 360.
227. 227 N.L.R.B. at 1189.
228. Id. at 1190.
229. Id.
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the employer by eliciting facts from the employee who might be "too
fearful or inarticulate to relate accurately the incident being investigated. '230 Applying this language, the Board reasoned that for a representative to be "knowledgeable" and thus carry out his prescribed
function at the meeting, it would be only logical to permit the representative to use a pre-interview consultation to gain familiarity with
23
the facts. '
In response to the dissenting Board members' concern that this
holding would transform all interviews into adversarial confrontations, the Board stated that increasing the knowledge of the union
representative would only enhance the fact-finding process. 232 The
dissenting Board members also argued that because the union, rather
than the employees themselves, requested the pre-interview consultation, section 8(a)(1) of the Act was not violated.2 33 The Board defended its position on two grounds. First it declared that the
argument "lacked merit" in light of the collective bargaining agreement's provision for union representation.2 3 4 Secondly, the Board observed that even if no such provision existed, the union must have the
opportunity to advise the employee of his right to representation,
prior to the interview, if the right is to have any substance, and it is
the "knowledgeable" union representative who is likely to be in23 5
formed as to such matters.
The Board mentioned, but did not squarely address, the employer's argument that permitting a pre-interview consultation would
230. 420 U.S. at 263. The Court stated that a knowledgeable representative
could both aid the employer, by clarifying the facts of the incident in order to speed
its resolution and save production time, and further the purpose of the Act: protection of employee's exercise of freedom of association for mutual aid or protection. Id.
at 261-63.
231. 227 N.L.R.B. at 1190. The Board suggested that the Supreme Court,
which had clearly endorsed the role of the "knowledgeable union representative,"
could not have meant "to put blinders on the union representative by denying him
the opportunity of learning the facts" through pre-interview consultation. Id. The
dissenting Board members, however, understood the Supreme Court to be endorsing
a union representative who was knowledgeable about grievance resolution, rather
than versed as to the particular facts of the incident. Id. at 1193 (Penello & Walther,

Members, dissenting).
232. Id. at 1190.
233. Id. at 1194. (Penello & Walther, Members, dissenting). The dissent stressed
that the right to representation was vested in the employee, and it could only be
exercised by the employee. Id. The same fundamental interpretation of Wezngarten

led the trial examiner and the Board in Coca-Cola Bottlhg Co. to conclude that it was

the employee's burden to request an alternate representative if the official first requested was unavailable. See Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 227 N.L.R.B. 1276, 1276 n.6

(1977).
234. 227 N.L.R.B. at 1190.
235. Id.
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undermine Wetngarten's objective of placing the parties at equal bargaining positions by giving the employee an advantage. 236 This
seems to be a legitimate employer concern, and the Board's failure to
address it, in addition to several other concerns expressed by the dissenting Board members, 23 7 suggests that its expansion of Weingarten
2
could not be fully supported.

38

Sensitive to some of the employer's concerns which the Board
overlooked, the Tenth Circuit refused to enforce the Board's order in
Cl'max. 239 The court first declined to expand the Weingarten rule to
cover situations where the union, not the employee, invokes the right
of representation. 240 Secondly, consonant with the employer's concern regarding the investigatory interview itself, the Tenth Circuit
concluded that pre-interview consultation would result in an adversarial interview, and thus would destroy its intended fact-finding
character. 24' Finally, citing Mount Vernon Tanker Co. v. NLRB 242 and
Coca-Cola Botthng Co. ,243 where the right to representation was also
denied, the Tenth Circuit observed that Weingarten's holding did not
2 44
extend to all meetings between the employee and the employer.
At the conclusion of its opinion, however, the Tenth Circuit indicated the parameters of its decision, and, in so doing limited its holding substantially. The court stated that while its holding precluded a
union or employee from demanding an opportunity to consult prior
to the investigatory interview on company time, it did not preclude
union-employee pre-interview consultation on the employee's own
236. Id. at 1189.

237. See id. at 1193-94 (Penello & Walther, Members, dissenting).
238. 584 F.2d at 363-64.
Nevertheless, the Board's argument as to the potential benefits of pre-interview
consultation has merit. See Comment, The Repercussions of Weingarten: An Employee's
Right to Representation at Investigatog Interviews, 64 MARQ. L. REV. 173, 195-96 (1980).
The representative who is well-versed both in the facts of the incident and grievance
procedure will be able to both protect the employee and clarify the facts for the
employer. Id. at 196. Furthermore, such effective representation may deter an employer from pursuing a meritless case. Id.
239. 584 F.2d at 365. The Tenth Circuit emphasized the Supreme Court's caveat in Weingarten that the right of representation should not interfere with legitimate
employer prerogatives. Id. at 363. The court noted that the employer interest in
such interviews stemmed from a good business motive. Furthermore, in the mining
business (as in Climax) where safety is a key concern, any disciplinary problems must
be fully investigated in a cooperative rather than adversarial context. Id.
240. Id.
241. Id. at 363-64.
242. 549 F.2d 571 (9th Cir. 1977) (Weingarten held inapplicable in a maritime

setting).
243. 227 N.L.R.B. 1276 (1977) (no right to a specific union representative under
Weingarten).
244. 584 F.2d at 364-65.
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time. 245 Furthermore, it interpreted Weingarten as requiring the employer to arrange the interview far enough in advance to give ample
246
opportunity for the employee and union to hold their interview.
While the Tenth Circuit may have limited the Board's expansion of
Wengarten in one respect, it apparently expanded Weingarten in another, by imposing this additional obligation on the employer.
In the very recent decision of Pacific Telephone & Telegraph Co. ,247
the Board reaffirmed its earlier position taken in Climax .248 In Pacific
Telephone, over a strong dissent, 249 the Board held that an employee is
entitled to a pre-interview consultation with a union representative. 250 The Board further held that, prior to the pre-interview consultation, an employee is also entitled to be informed of the subject
25
matter of the prospective investigatory interview. '
The Board reasoned that in order for the employee to be assured
his full right to representation, he must be granted a pre-interview
consultation with his representative 252 and be informed of the nature
of the prospective interview. 253 Moreover, the Board concluded, "the
act of 'consultation' is no less 'concerted activity for mutual aid and
'254
protection' than the act of representation itself."
245. Id. at 365.
246. Id. The court did not elaborate on the parameters of this additional obligation, but one commentator has interpreted the decision as requiring the employer
1) to provide a reasonable time and place for the interview so that representation will
be available and 2) to facilitate pre-interview consultation on noncompany time. See
Comment, supra note 238, at 196.
247. 262 N.L.R.B. No. 127 (1982).
248. Id. slip op. at 2. For a discussion of the Board's decision in Chmax, see notes
222-38 and accompanying text supra.
249. See 262 N.L.R.B. No. 127, slip op. at 8-17 (Hunter, Member, dissenting).
For further discussion of Member Hunter's dissent, see note 255 and accompanying
text infra.
250. 262 N.L.R.B. No. 127, slip op. at 2.
251. See id.
252. See id. at 3. The Board observed that the representative is precluded from
performing his role as a "knowledgeable representative" if he is not afforded a prior
consultation with the employee. Id. (citing Climax Molybdenum Co., 227 N.L.R.B.
1189 (1977), enforcement denied, 584 F.2d 360 (10th Cir. 1978)). Prior consultation "enables the representative to 'assist the employer by eliciting favorable facts and save
the employer production time by getting to the bottom of the incident.' " Id. (citing
NLRB v. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. 251, 263 (1975)). Further, according to the
Board, prior consultation with the employee allows the representative to "counsel
and assist the employee who may be 'too fearful or inarticulate to relate accurately to
the incident being investigated.' " Id. at 3-4 (citing NLRB v. Weingarten, Inc., 420
U.S. 251, 263 (1975)).
the right to prior consultation, and,
253. Id. at 4. The Board reasoned that "[ilf
therefore, the right to representation, is to be anything more than a hollow shell, both
the employee and his representative must have some indication as to the subject matter of the investigation." d.
254. d.
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The majority then addressed the dissent's concern that the preinterview right to consultation may both obfuscate the subsequent
255
interview and transform it into an adversary bargaining session.
The majority stated that the dissent failed to take into account the
balance which section 7 seeks to achieve between employer prerogatives and employee concerted activities. 256 In analyzing the burden
placed on employer prerogatives, the majority noted that the pre-interview consultation "need be nothing more than that which provides
the representative an opportunity to become familiar with the employees' circumstances. ' 257 The requirement that the employer inform the employee of the subject matter of the interview only compels
the employer to identify the misconduct for which discipline may be
imposed. 258 In contrast, the majority viewed the employee's interest
in protection against the employer's "investigatory machinery" to be
significant. 259 Consequently, the majority concluded that the rule announced in Clmax represented "a proper balance between the rights
' '26°
of employers and their employees.
255. Id. at 4-7. The dissent disagreed with the majority's interpretation of the
Weingarten Court's use of the term "knowledgeable representative." Member Hunter
contended that a "knowledgeable representative" was not one "who is completely
versed with the employee's version of the events," as the majority envisioned, but
rather, one "who is generally knowledgeable about grievance resolution." Id. at 1213 (Hunter, Member, dissenting) (citations omitted). The dissent concluded that the
majority's misconceived notion of the proper role of the union representative created
the risk of transforming the representative's function from that of fact-finder to that
of counsel. Id. at 14 (Hunter, Member, dissenting). The dissent also warned that
employer investigatory interviews would be transformed into full-scale, formal adversarial contests with all the attributes of criminal proceedings. Id. at 15. These probable developments, the dissent concluded, would result in gross, unwarranted
interference with legitimate employer prerogatives. Id.
256. Id. at 6-7.
257. Id. at 5.
258. Id.
259. Id. at 6-7. The Board noted that the Weingarten Court had expressed concern with certain techniques of investigation used by employers:
There has been a recent growth in the use of sophisticated techniques--such as closed circuit television, undercover security agents, and lie
detectors-to monitor and investigate the employees' conduct at their place
of work .

. .

. These techniques increase not only the employees' feeling of

apprehension, but also their need for experienced assistance in dealing with
them. Thus often . . . an investigative interview is conducted by security

specialists; the employee does not confront a supervisor who is known or
familiar to him, but a stranger trained in interrogation techniques.
Id. at 7 n.12 (citing NLRB v. Weingarten, Inc. 420 U.S. at 265 n.10).
260. Id. at 7.
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Union-InitiatedRequest to be Present During the Investigatory
Interview.

In Appalachian Power Co. ,261 the Board squarely addressed the is-

sue of whether a union's request for representation was sufficient to
trigger the employee's Weingarten rights.2 62 Although the Board did
not mention the Tenth Circuit's opinion in Cliax,,2 6 3 it appeared to
be swayed by the Chmax rationale when it concluded that the employee, not the union representative, must request representation in
order for the Weitgarten right to vest. 264 The Board reasoned that if
the right to be present at an investigatory interview could be asserted
by the union, the employee would be deprived of the opportunity to
decide whether the presence of the representative would be beneficial
2 65
or inimical to his interests.
H.

The Non- Union Employee's Right to Representation

Anchortank, Inc. 266 represents perhaps the most significant post261. 253 N.L.R.B. 931 (1980).
262. See id. at 932-33.

263. For a discussion of the Tenth Circuit's decision in Climax, see notes 223,
239-46 and accompanying text supra.
264. See 253 N.L.R.B. at 933. Although the issue of whether a union representative could precipitate the employee's right to representation at an investigatory interview was not squarely before the Tenth Circuit in Climax, the language of this
decision was certainly broad enough to encompass that situation. See 584 F.2d at
362.
265. See 253 N.L.R.B. at 933. The Board explained:
The reason for vesting their choice with the employee is clear. As the
Court explained in Weingarten, it is the individual employee who has an
immediate stake in the outcome of the disciplinary process for it is his job
security which may be jeopardized in any confrontation with management.
Therefore, it should be the employee's right to determine whether or not he
wishes union assistance to protect his employment interests . ...
If, as General Counsel contends, the right to be present at a disciplinary interview could be asserted by the union representative, the employee
no longer would have the choice of deciding whether the presence of the
representative was more or less advantageous to his interests.
Id.

A difficult situation arises when a union has secured through collective bargaining the right to be present at all investigating interviews, and an employee facing an
investigatory interview does not wish representation. See Comment, supra note 238,
at 183. This commentator contends that
[a] case such as this would necessitate the balancing of the union's interest
as the exclusive representative of the bargaining unit and its obligations and
rights under the collective bargaining agreement, and the employee's individual rights under Weingarten and his interest in resolving his disciplinary
problems in a private manner.
d.

266. 239 N.L.R.B. 430 (1978), enforced in part, 618 F.2d 1153 (5th Cir. 1980).
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Wengarten expansion of the right to representation by the Board.2 67
Viewed broadly, this case stands for the proposition that the Wngarten right to representation inheres to non-unionized employees as
268
well as unionized employees.
In Anchortank, the union won the representation election, but it
was not yet certified as the bargaining representative. 269 The Board
disregarded the status of the employees as non-union members, however, and held that the employer violated section 7 of the Act when it
denied the request of two of its employees for union representation
during interviews. 270 The Board reasoned that Weingarten's focus was
on the ability of the individual employee "to act concertedly for protection in the face of a threat to job security, and not upon the right
to be represented by a duly designated collective-bargaining
2 7
representative. " ,
The Fifth Circuit ordered partial enforcement of the Board's order in Anchortank, Inc. v. NLRB. 272 The court noted that the record
did not reveal whether the requested representative was an employee
of Anchortank; 2 71 it therefore assumed that the requested representa267. For a discussion of cases leading up to Anchortank, see note 271 infra.
268. 239 N.L.R.B. at 431. In Anchortank, the narrow factual question presented
to the Board was whether an employee was entitled to union representation at an
investigatory interview held during the hiatus between the union's challenged victory
in a representation election and its subsequent certification as bargaining representative. Id. However, the rationale employed by the Board indicated that the Board
intended to extend the Weingarten right to representation to non-unionized employees. Id. at 432. The Board stressed:
[W]e are persuaded that, in Weingarten, the Court's primary concern
was with the right of employees to have some measure of protection when
faced with a confrontation with the employer which might result in adverse
action against the employee. These employee concerns remain whether or not the
employees are representedby a union.
Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
269. Id. at 430.
270. See id. at 431. On March 25, 1977, a supervisor required Anchortank employee Herbert Charles to attend an investigatory interview without the assistance of
a representative. Id. at 430. On May 29, 1977, the plant manager required
Anchortank employee Moshinobu Kittley to submit to a disciplinary interview without the aid of a representative. Id.
271. See id. at 431. See also Oil, Chemical & Atomic Workers Int'l Union v.
NLRB, 547 F.2d 575, 592 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 966 (1977) ("Section
7 protects the right to act in concert, not merely the right to act in concert with a
recognized union"); NLRB v. Columbia Univ., 541 F.2d 922, 931 (2d Cir. 1976)
("the protection afforded to concerted activities under the NLRA applies equally to
workers in unionized or in non-unionized firms"); Glomac Plastics, Inc., 234
N.L.R.B. 1309, 1311 (1978), enforced, 600 F.2d 3 (2d Cir. 1979) (violation of § 8(a)(1)
to deny non-unionized employee's request for representation, because "Section 7
rights are enjoyed by all employees and are in no wise dependent on union representation for their implementation.").
272. 618 F.2d 1153, 1169 (5th Cir. 1980).
273. Id. at 1158.
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tive was not an Anchortank employee. 274 Consequently, the court
addressed the narrower question of whether an employee's section 7
rights are violated when the employer denies the employee's request
for a union affiliated nonemployee representative at an investigatory
interview after the union has won an election, but before the union
has been certified. Narrowing the broader implications of the Board's
decision, the court held that an employee's request for union representation during the Weigarten investigatory interview became protected "concerted activity," within the meaning of section 7 of the
Act, only after the union election. 275 Nevertheless, it agreed with the
Board that certification of the union was not a prerequisite to an employee's successful invocation of his Wengarten rights, and thus with
regard to one of the employees in Anchortank, 2 7 6 upheld the Board's
2 77
decision.
274. Id. Prior to this, the court stated that if the record had established that the
requested representative were an Anchortank employee, "concerted activity" clearly
would have been established. Id. at 1157 (citing NLRB v. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S.
251, 269 n.1 (1975) (Powell, J., dissenting); Oil, Chemical & Atomic Workers Int'l
Union v. NLRB, 547 F.2d 575, 592 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 966 (1979);
NLRB v. Columbia University, 541 F.2d 922, 931 n.5 (2d Cir. 1976)).
275. 618 F.2d at 1162. The court observed that "concerted activity," a term of
art, has been susceptible to divergent interpretation. Id. at 1160. The courts have
split over the question whether the action of a single employee must involve both a
concerted purpose and a concerted effect to obtain section 7 protection, or whether a
concerted effect alone is sufficient. Id. (citing NLRB v. Interboro Contractors, 388
F.2d 495, 500 (2d Cir. 1967) (crucial inquiry in determining whether single employees' activities were "concerted" for purposes of section 7 is whether the employee's
activity had an "effect" on his fellow employees, and not whether group activity was
intended); Mushroom Transp. Co. v. NLRB, 330 F.2d 683-85 (3d Cir. 1964) (activities of a single employee are concerted only if they "are engaged in with the object of
initiating or inducing or preparing for group action.")). See generally Note, Constructive
ConcertedActivity, supra note 93.

In Anchortank, the Fifth Circuit concluded that before a representative election,
an employee's request for union representation failed to satisfy even the more lenient
Interboro approach because, "the presence of a union representative does not have the
effect on other employees essential to the satisfaction of the Interboro standard of concerted activity." 618 F.2d at 1161. However, the Fifth Circuit further noted that the
situation was "radically altered" after a union has won a representation election,
even if that victory has been challenged. Id. at 1162. The court concluded that, at
this point, an employee's request for union representation at an investigatory interview satisfied the rigorous Mushroom "purpose" test because, "[a]fter the union has
won the election, the employee quite properly perceives his request to be one for the
concerted mutual aid and protection of his fellows, for the union then stands in for all
the unit employees." Id.
276. See 618 F.2d at 1165-69. The Fifth Circuit granted only partial enforcement of the Board's order. Id. at 1169. Since the factual record did not indicate
whether the employee's "disciplinary" interview contained the necessary investigatory element or was merely a meeting to inform him or his employer's pre-determined resolve to discipline him, the court of appeals remanded the matter to the
Board to determine the nature of the interview. d. at 1168-69.
277. See id. at 1165.
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In Materials Research Corp. ,278 the Board was confronted with a
situation in which an employee, who was not represented by a statutory bargaining representive, was denied his request to have a coworker accompany him to an investigatory interview. 279 Although
the Board acknowledged that Weingarten spoke explicitly in terms of
the right to the assistance of a "union representative, '280 it contended
that the Weigarten Court adopted this language because it accurately
portrayed the facts of that particular case, and not because the Court
wished to limit the right exclusively to unionized employees. 28 1 Since
the protection offered by section 7 has been held not to depend on
whether or not employees are unionized, the Board held that the em28 2
ployer violated section 8(a)(l) by denying the employee's request.
Similarly, in an earlier decision, Ilnois Bell Telephone Co. ,283 the
Board held that in a unionized unit, when the union representative is
not available, an employee facing an investigatory interview can designate a fellow union employee as representative even if his designee
is not currently a union official. 284 The Board concluded that the
278. 262 N.L.R.B. No. 122 (1982).
279. Id. at 1-2.
280. Id. at 7 (citing NLRB v. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. at 261).
281. Id. at 7-8. The Board argued that the Weingarten Court's rationale supported its conclusion that the right to representation during investigatory interviews
vests in nonunionized as well as unionized employees. The Board noted that the
Weingarten Court had emphasized that the right to representation derived from the
employee's § 7 rights, and not from the union's § 9 right to act as exclusive bargaining representative. Id.
282. Id. at 9-20 (citing NLRB v. Washington Aluminum Co., Inc., 370 U.S. 9
(1962)). In Washington Aluminum, the Supreme Court held that the protections of § 7
extended to unorganized employees who had walked off the job to protest the lack of
adequate heat in their plant. NLRB v. Washington Aluminum Co., Inc., 370 U.S. 9,
14 (1962).
In relying upon Washington Aluminum, the Materials Research Corp. Board noted:

It is by now axiomatic that, with only very limited exceptions, the protection afforded by Section 7 does not vary depending on whether or not the
employees involved are represented by a union, or whether the conduct involved is related, directly or indirectly, to union activity or collective
bargaining.
262 N.L.R.B. No. 122, slip. op. at 9 (citations omitted).
283. 251 N.L.R.B. 932 (1980), enforced in part , 674 F.2d 618 (7th Cir. 1982).
284. Id. at 932-33. In reaching its conclusion, the Board relied heavily on its
earlier decision in Anchortank, where it stated that "[tihe Court and the Board [in
Weingarten] placed the emphasis upon the employer's [sic] right to act concertedly for
protection in the face of a threat to job security, and not upon the right to be represented by a duly designated collective-bargaining representative." Id. at 933 (quoting Anchortank, Inc., 239 N.L.R.B. 430 (1978)). The Illinois Bell Board also noted
that in Anchortank, it had stated that the representative's function at an investigatory
interview was not that of a bargaining representative; consequently a fellow employee, with no official union status, could serve as effectively as a union official. Id.
at 933-34 (citing Anchortank, Inc., 239 N.L.R.B. 430, 431 (1978)).
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denial of such a request was a violation of section 8(a)(1). 285
I.

The Role of the Representative During the Weingarten
Investigatory Interview.

In a line of cases beginning with Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. ,286
the Board attempted to define the role that the representative was
permitted to play during the investigatory interview. Weingarten had
stated that "the employer has no duty to bargain with any union representative who may be permitted to attend the investigatory interview."'2 8 7 Prior to Southwestern Bell, the extent to which the union
representative could participate in the interview had not been examined by the Board.
In Southwestern Bell, an employer conducted an investigatory in
which he told the union representative not to say anything, while telling the employee to answer in his own words. 28 8 The Board held that
because the representative was required to remain silent, the employee was denied the effective representation to which he is entitled
under section 8(a)(1). 28 9 In so holding, the Board expanded the representative's function from that of a mute, passive observer to an active participant.
The Board reasoned that the Supreme Court in Wengarten intended to strike a balance between the right of an employer to investigate the conduct of his employees, and the right of an employee to
fair representation. 2 90 The Board concluded that "[i]t is clear from
the Supreme Court's decision in [Wengarten] that the role of the statutory representative at an investigatory interview is to provide 'assistance' and 'counsel' to the employee being interrogated." '29 1 Because
the union steward in Southwestern Bell had attempted only to provide
such assistance and counsel, and not to transform the interview into a
bargaining session, which was expressly prohibited by Wengarten, the
Board held that the employer had violated section 8(a)(1) of the
Act

292

The Fifth Circuit denied enforcement of Southwestern Bell. 293 The
court of appeals noted that although a representative must be allowed
285.
286.
287.
288.
289.
290.
291.
292.
293.

Id. at 934.
251 N.L.R.B. 612 (1980), enforcement denied, 667 F.2d 470 (5th Cir. 1982).
See 420 U.S. at 259.
251 N.L.R.B. at 612.
See id. at 612-13.
Id. at 613.
Id.
Id.
See Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. NLRB, 667 F.2d 470 (5th Cir. 1982).
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to assist the employee and clarify the facts, the Supreme Court had
stated in Wengarten that "[t]he employer. . . is free to insist that he is
only interested, at that time, in hearing the employee's own account
of the matter. '294 According to the Fifth Circuit's interpretation of
the facts of Southwestern Bell, there was no section 8(a)(l) violation in
this case: although the employer had requested the representative to
remain silent during one portion of the interview, at the conclusion of
the interview the employer told the representative that he was free to
29 5
make any additions, suggestions or clarifications.
In a footnote, 296 the court in Southwestern Bell distinguished
NLRB v. Texaco, Inc., a case decided by the Ninth Circuit, by observing that Texaco involved the employer's refusal to permit any participation whatsoever in the investigatory interview.29 7 In Texaco, at the
outset of an investigatory interview, the employer's foreman informed
the union representative that he would not be permitted to say anything during the interview. 298 Enforcing the Board's order, the Ninth
Circuit in Texaco rejected the employer's contention that, since Wehgarten did not compel the employer to bargain with the representative
during the investigatory interview, the employer could thereby insist
on hearing only the employee's account. 29 9 Relying upon language
from Weingarten, 3°° the Texaco court of appeals concluded that the
employer's absolute position was contrary to both the spirit and letter
of the Supreme Court's decision. 30 ' According to the court of appeals, "[t]he representative should be able to take an active role in
' 30 2
assisting the employee to present the facts.
Viewed together, Southwestern Bell and Texaco stand for the proposition that an employer violates the Act by refusing to permit the
union representative to clarify certain matters both before the inter294. Id. at 473 (quoting NLRB v. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. at 259-60).
295. See id.

296. 667 F.2d at 474 n.3.
297. Id (citing NLRB v. Texaco, Inc., 659 F.2d 124 (9th Cir. 1981)).
298. 659 F.2d at 125.
299. Id. at 126.
300. See id. (quoting NLRB v. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. at 260). The Texaco
court quoted the following language from Weingarlen:
The representative is present to assist the employee, and may attempt to
clarify the facts or suggest other employees who may have knowledge of
them. The employer, however, is free to insist that he is only interested, at
that time, in hearing the employee's own account of the matter under
investigation.

Id.
301. See id.

302. See t'd. (citing Alfred M. Lewis, Inc. v. NLRB, 587 F.2d 403, 409-10 (9th
Cir. 1978); Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 251 N.L.R.B. 612 (1980)).
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view and afterwards. But the employer does not violate the Act by
requiring the representative to remain silent during the interview so
long as subsequent clarification of the matters discussed is permitted.
J. Evolving Remedies for Employer Violations of the Weingarten Rule
The traditional make-whole remedies of reinstatement, back
pay, and expungement of records are not invariably assured when
We'ngarten violations are established. 30 3 Section 10(c) of the National
Labor Relations Act provides in part that "[n]o order of the Board
shall require the reinstatement of any individual as an employee who
has been suspended or discharged, or the payment to him of back
''30 4
pay, if such individual was suspended or discharged for cause.
Relying on this language, the Board and the courts have been reluctant to enforce make-whole remedies if the employer relied on information obtained outside of the unlawful interview to discipline the
30 5
employee.
The initial approach adopted by the Board after Wengarten was
to grant full make-whole remedies to the employee if the employer
was found to have engaged in an unlawful investigatory interview
without the requested representation. 30 6 However, in 1980 the Board
in Kraft Foods30 7 articulated a bifurcated test to determine whether
make-whole remedies should be awarded to an employee whose Weingarten rights had been violated. 30 8 The employee in Kraft Foods was
discharged for engaging in a fight. 30 9 The ALJ found that the employer conducted an investigatory interview in violation of Wengarten
303. The Board has the authority to restore the status quo ante (and order makewhole remedies) where restoration is necessary to "undo the effects of violations of the
Act" and where the remedy is "well designed to promote the policies of the Act."
Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 216 (1964) (quoting NLRB
v. Seven Up Bottling Co., 344 U.S. 344, 346 (1957)).
304. 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1976).
305. For a discussion of the general approach adopted by the Board and the
courts to granting make-whole remedies, see notes 306-48 and accompanying text
infra .
306. See, e.g., Certified Grocers of Cal., 227 N.L.R.B. 1211 (1977), enforcement dented, 587 F.2d 449 (9th Cir. 1978) (Board ordered back pay and expungement of
employee's record where employer conducted an unlawful interview that resulted in
disciplinary layoff of employee, even though Board concluded the decision to discipline the employee had been made prior to the interview); See also Potter Elec. Signal, 237 N.L.R.B. 1289 (1978), enforcement denied, 600 F.2d 120 (1979). For a
discussion of Potter, see notes 317-23 and accompanying text infra.
307. 251 N.L.R.B. 598 (1980).
308. Id. at 598.
309. Id. The employee was discharged for assaulting a fellow employee after
their fork lifts collided. In an unlawful investigatory interview, conducted by the
employer, the employee denied that the assault ever occurred and identified a photograph of the site of the forklift collision. The employer independently interviewed
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and ordered reinstatement and back pay for the employee. 310 The
Board affirmed the finding of a Weingarten violation but issued only a
31
cease and desist order. The employee remained discharged. 1
Central to the Board's bifurcated test was the question of
whether the disciplinary decision was based on information obtained
during the unlawful interview. 31 2 According to the Board, the charging party must first make aprimafacie showing that an investigatory
interview was held in violation of Wet'ngarten representation rights and
that the employee was then disciplined for the conduct which was the
subject of the unlawful interview. 3 13 Upon establishment of theprima
factie case, the burden shifts to the employer to show that the employer's decision to discipline the employee was not based on informa31 4
tion gleaned from the unlawful interview.
In Kraft, the respondent successfully met this burden. The majority concluded that the employer's decision to discharge was made
on the strength of independent witnesses' corroboration of the assault,
rather than on the basis of the employee's denial of the incident in the
unlawful investigatory interview. 31 5 Therefore, only a cease and desist order for the section 8(a)(l) violation of the Weingarten right to
31 6
representation was issued and the employee remained discharged.
In NLRB v. Potter Electric Signal Co. ,317 a decision issued prior to
several witnesses to the assault. This independent information was the basis for the
discharge decision. Id.
310. Id.
311. Id. at 599.
312. Id. at 598.
313. Id.
314. Id. See also Gulf State Mfg., 261 N.L.R.B. No. 119, 110 L.R.R.M. (BNA)
1132 (1982) (employee was not granted make-whole remedy of revocation of written
warning that was issued after unlawful interview because Board found that the decision to discipline had been made prior to the interview); ITT Corp., 261 N.L.R.B.
No. 34, 110 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1025 (1982) (employee was not granted any makewhole remedies because his discharge was not based on information obtained at the
unlawful interview because he had refused to answer questions at the interview);
Coyne Cylinder Co., 251 N.L.R.B. 1503 (1980) (employee who was discharged for
"smoking pot" was not awarded a make-whole remedy because the decision to discharge was based solely on information obtained before the unlawful interview). But
see E.I. DuPont De Nemours 259 N.L.R.B. 1210 (1982) (employee was granted the
make-whole remedy of rescission of a written reprimand because the Board found
that the discipline was an outgrowth of the unlawful interview).
315. 251 N.L.R.B. at 598. Because the employee simply identified a picture of
the site of the fork-lift collision and denied the assault, there was no information
obtained at the interview which could provide "cause" for the discipline as required
by § 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act. Id. at 599. For the text of § 10(c),
see text accompanying note 304 supra.
316. Id.
317. 600 F.2d 120 (8th Cir. 1979). In Potter, two employees engaged in a loud
argument during working hours which resulted in one employee striking the other. A
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Kraft, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the Board's finding of an unlawful
investigatory interview in violation of Wetngarten, but denied enforcement of the Board's make-whole order. 31 8 In setting forth its reasons
for the denial of the remedy, the court established a more stringent
test than the Board in Kraft for determining whether make-whole
remedies are appropriate. 31 9 Unlike the Board in Kraft, the Potter
court based its decision not on the source of the information leading
to the disciplinary action, but rather on a determination of whether
the employees were discharged for requesting union assistance. 320 In
a subsequent decision, Montgomery Ward & Co. v. NLRB, 32 1 the Eighth
Circuit relied on Potter, and stated that it stood for the proposition
that "where it is clear that employees were discharged for good cause
and not for requesting union assistance at an investigatory interview,
Section 10(c) of the Act . . . precludes an order of back pay and reinstatement under such circumstances. '322 This is the approach that

323
has been generally adopted by the courts of appeals.
While neither the Board nor the courts explicitly follow Krafl or
Potter, in general, courts are more reluctant than the Board to order
make-whole remedies. 324 For example, the Eleventh Circuit in NLRB
v. Southern Bell Telephone Co. 325 affirmed the Board's cease and desist
order but denied enforcement of the make-whole remedy ordered by
the Board. 32 6 The employee in Southern Bell was suspended for discrepancies in her work records after offering no explanation for them

supervisor came to the scene, shut down the production line and told the two employees to punch out and report to the cafeteria. Both employees' requests for union
representation at the subsequent investigatory interviews were denied. Id. at 123.
318. Id. at 124.
319. For a discussion of the test designed by the Board in Kraf2, see notes 307-16
and accompanying text supra.
320. 600 F.2d at 123. The court concluded that "it is clear that the employees
were discharged for a fight that resulted in shutting down the production line and
that the section 8(a)(1) violation was only incidental to the investigation which preceded the firing." Id.
321. 664 F.2d 1095 (8th Cir. 1981).
322. Id. at 1097 (citations omitted). In this case, two employees admitted stealing company property at an unlawful interview and were subsequently discharged.
The court reasoned that "the employees effected their own discharge by stealing and
the section 8(a)(1) violation was simply incidental to the investigation which preceded the firing." Id.
323. For a discussion of appellate courts which have cited the Potter approach,
see notes 332-33 & 337 and accompanying text infra.
324. See, e.g., Southern Bell Tel. Co., 251 N.L.R.B. 1194 (1980), enforcement denied
in part, 676 F.2d 499 (1lth Cir. 1982); General Motors Corp., 251 N.L.R.B. 850
(1980),enforcement denied in part, 674 F.2d 576 (6th Cir. 1982); Potter Elec. Signal Co.,

237 N.L.R.B. 1289 (1978),enforcement denied in part, 600 F.2d 120 (8th Cir. 1979).
325. 676 F.2d 499 (1 1th Cir. 1982).
326. Id. at 502-03.
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at an unlawful investigatory interview conducted by the employer. 3 27
The Eleventh Circuit rejected the Board's contention that the employee was punished for exercising her right to request union representation rather than for her inaccurate work. 32 8 Instead, the court
concluded that no "causal connection" could be inferred "between
the suspension and the failure to explain, from Southern Bell's mere
refusal to accede to [the employee's] request for a union representative."'329 The court observed that the Supreme Court in Weingarten
"implicitly rejected such inference." 33 0 To support this construction
of the Weingarten decision, the Eleventh Circuit pointed to the
Supreme Court's allowance for an employer's denial of representation
so long as the employer refrained from acting on any information
33
obtained at the interview. '
Purporting to rely on NLRB v. Potter Electric Signal Co. ,332 the
Sixth Circuit in General Motors Corp. v. NLRB 33 3 also refused to order
enforcement of make-whole remedies. In General Motors, the employer's security guard observed the employee at a bowling alley during working hours. 33 4 The employee subsequently admitted this
during an unlawful investigatory interview. 335 Although the court
cited Potter for support, it did not follow Potter's reasoning. Instead of
inquiring into whether the employee was fired for requesting union
representation, the court considered whether there was "independent
327. Id. at 500. The employer discovered inaccuracies in the tickets completed
by the employee which were designed to monitor certain equipment. The employee
was interviewed by her supervisor but refused to answer any questions without a
union representative present. Subsequently, the employee received a two-week disciplinary suspension. Id.
328. Id. at 500-501.
329. Id. at 501.
330. Id.
331. Id. The court noted that Southern Bell had not terminated the interview
after the employee's request for representation but the court also refused to find a
causal link between the discipline and the employee's refusal to explain work discrepancies. The interview was not hostile and no incriminating information was obtained
during it. Accordingly, the court concluded that the case involved only a denial of
union representation which was not itself enough to grant a make-whole remedy. Id.
at 502.
332. 600 F.2d 120 (8th Cir. 1979), denying enforcement, 237 N.L.R.B. 1289 (1978).
For a discussion of the Potter Electric Signal decision, see notes 317-22 and accompanying text supra.
333. 674 F.2d 576 (6th Cir. 1982).
334. Id. at 577.
335. Id. The employee was questioned on three occasions. At the third investigatory interview, the employee requested representation. Although the request was
ignored, the employee continued to respond to the questioning and admitted to being
at the bowling alley during working hours. The employee was discharged the next
day. Id.
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evidence of good cause for discharge. '336
In NLRB v. Il'nois Bell Telephone Co. 331 the Seventh Circuit also

cited Potter with approval, but like the Sixth Circuit in General Motors, 338 its reliance on Potter was not borne out in its reasoning. The
339
employee in llinots Bell was a long distance telephone operator.
During an unlawful investigatory interview, she admitted that she
had improperly reduced certain time charges and had made personal
calls. 34 0 In its opinion, the Board 34 1 used the test devised by the
Board in Krafi ,342 and concluded that the employer in Il'nots Bell had

"failed to meet its burden of showing that the decision to discharge
was not based upon information obtained at the unlawful interview." '343 Accordingly, it ordered reinstatement, back pay, and ex3 44

pungement of records.
The Seventh Circuit enforced the Board's order in all requests
except the remedy, and remanded the case to the Board for additional fact-finding.3 45 Following the reasoning of Potter, the court initially stated that it was clear that the employee had not been
336. Id. at 578. The "independent evidence of good cause" test is closer to the
Board's approach in Krafi which also looked to the existence of evidence obtained
independent of the unlawful interview. For a discussion of the Krafl test, see notes
307-16 and accompanying text supra.
337. 674 F.2d 618 (7th Cir. 1982), denying enforcement, 251 N.L.R.B. 932 (1980).
338. 674 F.2d 576 (6th Cir. 1982). For a discussion of the General Motors decision, see notes 333-36 and accompanying text supra.
339. 674 F.2d at 620.
340. Id. at 621. Because the union representative was not available at the time
of the interview, the employee requested to be represented by a fellow union member. Her request was denied and during the subsequent unlawful interview, the employee admitted her improper activities. She was discharged two days later. Id.
341. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 251 N.L.R.B. at 934.
342. For a discussion of the test developed by the Board in Krafi, see notes 30716 and accompanying text supra.
The Board, in Ilhnois Bell, did not explicitly rely on Krafi, although it did describe a two-part analyis that required an initial showing of an unlawful interview
and then a shifting of the burden to the employer to show that the decision to discipline was not based on information obtained at the interview. 251 N.L.R.B. at 934.
Krafi was cited by the majority in a footnote which noted that the concurring Board
member in Ilhnois Bell had argued in his dissenting opinion in Krafl that the Board's
two-part test was too broad. Id. at 934 n.18.
343. Id. at 934-35. The Board noted that the employer had "in fact admitted
that it based its decision to discharge . . .[the employee] on her oral admissions at
the interview." Id. at 934.
344. Id. at 935.
345. 674 F.2d at 623. The court reasoned that the company was entitled to
show that its discharge of the employee was not based solely upon evidence obtained
at the unlawful interview and remanded the case to the Board to determine whether
the company had sufficient independent evidence to support the discharge. Id.
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discharged for requesting union representation.3 46 However, instead
of concluding from this that the Board's remedy was inappropriate,
the Seventh Circuit considered, as the Board had done in Kraft,
whether the discharge could have been supported by evidence obtained outside the interview.3 47 Finding the record inadequate on
this point, the court remanded the case to the Board to determine the
availability of such independent evidence. 348 Thus, while articulating the reasoning of the Eighth Circuit in Potter, the Seventh Circuit
ultimately applied the more liberal test set down by Krajt in determining the propriety of a make-whole remedy.
V.

CONCLUSION:

POLICY OVERVIEW AND PROSPECTUS FOR
FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS

Weingarten was a fundamentally sound and appropriate decision.

It clarified and resolved unsettled issues in a troubled area of labor
relations law. The decision emphasized the statutory right of an individual employee to have representation at an investigatory employer

interview which the employee reasonably feared might result in adverse employment consequences. By affirming the Board's objective
test of the reasonableness of the employee's apprehension under all of
the particular circumstances, Weingarten abandoned the practice of
relying on the employer's stated purpose for the interview. In so doing, the Court made a positive and timely contribution to restoring
the parity between management and labor that is essential to harmonious and productive labor relations. The Court managed to safeguard the rights of the individual employee without giving him the
power to insist on representation at every possible discussion with the
employer. Important post- Weingarten decisions have been characterized by a complex elaboration of exceptions and expansions on the
right to representation.
As the Supreme Court stated in Weigarten, the right to union
representation arose only where the employee requested representa346. For a discussion of the Potter decision see notes 317-22 and accompanying
text supra.
347. Id. The court reasoned that it must "balance the need of the company to
maintain an honest and efficient workforce, with the duty to enforce the policies of
the Act . . . ." Id.
348. Id. at 621. While the approach adopted by the Seventh Circuit resembles
Krafi because of its requirement that independent evidence exist, it is not a strict
application of Krajt. The Board would require the granting of a make-whole remedy
if the employer had failed to meet the burden of proof in showing that the decision
was not based on the information obtained during the unlawful interview. For an
example of when the Board concluded that the employer had not met this burden of
proof, see notes 341-344 and accompanying text supra.
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tion. 349 A related issue that has arisen is whether upon the union's
request an employer is obligated to permit the union to confer with
the employee prior to the interview. 350 Equating this issue with that
decided by Weigarten, the Tenth Circuit declared that the employer
had no such obligation. 3 5 ' Nevertheless, there is dictum in the Tenth
Circuit's opinion which suggests that the union's request will be
honored where the pre-interview consultation is on the employee's
time. 352 The Tenth Circuit also stated in dictum that the employee
and his representative have a right to advance notice of the investigatory interview so that they can arrange for a pre-interview consulta353
tion on the employee's time.
Wengarten also left for later courts the task of defining the precise
role of the union representative during the investigatory interview.
One court has greatly limited this role by permitting the employer to
direct the union representative to postpone comments until after the
35 4
interview.
Perhaps most importantly, the right to representation has been
extended to employees who have elected a union, but whose union
has not yet been certified. 355 Additionally, the Board has held that
employees are not limited to union officials as their representatives
and has indicated that when they are unavailable the employees may
call upon fellow employees to represent them at investigatory
356
interviews.
These important post-Wengarten decisions have both resolved
and raised troubling questions. Throughout the course of future decisions, the Board and the courts must strive to maintain parity between labor and management.
349. 420 U.S. at 257.

350.
351.
352.
353.
354.
355.
356.

For a discussion of this issue, see notes 222-60 and accompanying text supra.
See notes 239-46 and accompanying text supra.
See note 245 and accompanying text supra.
See note 246 and accompanying text supra.
See notes 294-95 and accompanying text supra.
See notes 266-77 and accompanying text supra.
See notes 278-85 and accompanying text supra.
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